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Article 
Veblen Brands 
Jeremy N. Sheff † 
Then they yelled at the ones who had stars at the start,  
“We’re exactly like you! You can’t tell us apart.  
We’re all just the same, now, you snooty old smarties!  
And now we can go to your frankfurter parties!” 
 
“Good grief!” groaned the ones who had stars at the first. 
“We’re still the best Sneetches and they are the worst. 
But, now, how in the world will we know,” they all frowned,  
“If which kind is what, or the other way round?” 
 
Then up came McBean with a very sly wink 
And he said, “Things are not quite as bad as you think. 
So you don’t know who’s who. That is perfectly true. 
But come with me, friends. Do you know what I’ll do? 
I’ll make you, again, the best Sneetches on beaches 
And all it will cost you is ten dollars eaches.”1 
 
 
†  Associate Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law. This 
Article was selected for inclusion in the 2011 Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Fo-
rum at Stanford Law School. I am grateful to participants in that forum, as 
well as those in the 10th Annual Intellectual Property Scholars Conference at 
the University of California at Berkeley, the First Annual Tri-State Region 
Intellectual Property Workshop at Fordham Law School, the 2011 Works-In-
Progress in Intellectual Property Colloquium at Boston University School of 
Law, and the Junior Faculty Colloquium at Touro Law Center, for their 
thoughtful comments and questions. I am also grateful for comments on earli-
er drafts from Professors Katya Assaf, Barton Beebe, Marc DeGirolami, Laura 
Heymann, Paul Kirgis, Mark Lemley, Peter Menell, Mark Movsesian, Lisa 
Ramsey, Jennifer Rothman, Jessica Silbey, Keith Sharfman, Rebecca Tushnet, 
and Adam Zimmerman. Additional thanks to Christopher Holtz for able re-
search assistance. All errors are the author’s alone. Copyright © 2012 by Jer-
emy N. Sheff. 
 1. DR. SEUSS, THE SNEETCHES AND OTHER STORIES 12–15 (1961). 
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  INTRODUCTION   
Soon after Sonia Sotomayor was nominated to the Supreme 
Court, the New York Times ran a lengthy profile of the prospec-
tive Justice on its front page.2 Describing her stint in private 
practice at a “boutique commercial law firm in Manhattan,”3 
the Times reported: 
  A large part of Ms. Sotomayor’s work was fighting the counterfeit-
ers who copied products of Fendi, the luxury goods company, and its 
well-known ‘double F ’ logo. Sometimes, that meant suing counterfeit-
ers to stop them from importing fake Fendi goods. 
  At other times, it involved more derring-do: if the firm had a tip 
from the United States Customs Office about a suspicious shipment, 
Ms. Sotomayor would often be involved in the risky maneuver of go-
ing to the warehouse to have the merchandise seized. One incident 
that figures largely in firm lore was a seizure in Chinatown, where 
the counterfeiters ran away, and Ms. Sotomayor got on a motorcycle 
and gave chase.4 
This image stood out in the field of Justice Sotomayor’s 
substantial accomplishments. The New Yorker declared that 
the motorcycle anecdote “may be the best passage in the Times 
profile,”5 and other mainstream media outlets agreed.6 Of 
course, the story had been somewhat romanticized,7 but it 
hardly mattered. Americans now had a mental image of one of 
our nation’s highest judicial officers in her righteous youth, 
 
 2. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, A Trailblazer and a Dreamer, N.Y. TIMES, May 
27, 2009, at A1. 
 3. Id. at A19. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Amy Davidson, A Motorcycle, a Playground, and a Justice, NEW 
YORKER: NEWS DESK, (May 27, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/ 
newsdesk/2009/05/close-read-a-motorcycle-a-playground-and-a-justice.html. 
 6. See, e.g., Karen Sloan, As IP Boutique Litigator, Former Partners Say 
Sotomayor Was a Quick Study, Hard Worker, N.Y. L.J., May 29, 2009, at 2 (cit-
ing the Times’s description of the motorcycle chase as evidence of Sotomayor’s 
“fearless” nature); Holly Bailey, Sotomayor, Action Star?, NEWSWEEK: DAILY 
BEAST (May 27, 2009, 2:11 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/ 
blogs/the-gaggle/2009/05/27/sotomayor-action-star.html (expressing surprise 
at Sotomayor’s participation in a motorcycle chase). 
 7. See Andrew Cohen, Is Sotomayor Supremely Stylish? VF DAILY (June 
5, 2009, 2:27 PM), http://www.vanityfair.com/online/daily/2009/06/is-sotomayor 
-supremely-stylish (“Turns out that Judge Sotomayor, when she was in private 
practice, represented both [Fendi and Ferrari] in litigation against those who 
sought to sell knockoffs of the brand. She disclosed that she once spent an af-
ternoon in a bulletproof vest tooling around Shea Stadium on a motorcycle 
chasing counterfeiters. No, she was not driving the motorcycle. And, no, she 
did not evidently enjoy it. But she did enjoy the ‘Fendi Crush,’ a law-
enforcement promotion wherein counterfeited products were crushed in gar-
bage trucks.”). 
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boldly tearing through the narrow streets of a rough neighbor-
hood in pursuit of a gang of cowardly lawbreakers. 
Beneath the surface of this law-and-order morality play, 
however, is a deeper narrative playing on a host of social, eco-
nomic, and racial undercurrents. This narrative pits Justice 
Sotomayor—a case study of play-by-the-rules social mobility8 
between the working-class Puerto Rican communities of the 
East Bronx and the largely white, male legal institutions of up-
per-middle-class Manhattan9—against faceless, grasping, and 
unscrupulous Asian immigrants from the outer boroughs.10 And 
of course, standing behind the future Justice and directing her 
actions are the modern-day equivalents of old-world aristocra-
cy: Fendi, a venerable Italian fashion house,11 owned by a Par-
is-based multinational luxury brand holding company,12 and 
run by a platinum-haired celebrity German artistic director.13 
In short, this one vignette is a microcosm of global competition 
over wealth and status14—a competition that manifests itself in 
 
 8. Remarks to the Democratic Leadership Council, 1 PUB. PAPERS 40 
(Jan. 12, 2002) (“The main idea here is still the old idea of the American 
dream, that if you work hard and play by the rules, you ought to have a decent 
life and a chance for your children to have a better one.”). 
 9. See Stolberg, supra note 2, at A18–A19. 
 10. As the Vanity Fair follow-up to the New York Times profile makes 
clear, the motorcycle episode actually took place in the area around Shea Sta-
dium, the former home of the New York Mets in Queens County. Cohen, supra 
note 6. This area claims the most ethnically diverse population and the largest 
immigrant population in the country, including two major concentrations of 
Chinese-born immigrants. Noel Pangilinan, Who Are the People in Your Neigh-
borhood: NYC Immigrants by the Numbers, QUEENS7.COM (Feb. 21, 2011) 
http://queens7.com/who-are-the-people-in-your-neighborhoods-nyc’s-immigrants 
-by-the-number/.  
 11. See History, FENDI, http://mobile.fendi.com/en/forever-fendi/history (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2011) (placing the fashion house’s origins in Rome in 1925). 
 12. MOËT HENNESSY LOUIS VUITTON, LVMH: PASSIONATE ABOUT CREA-
TIVITY, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 25 (2010), http://www.lvmh.com/uploads/assets/ 
Com-fi/Documents/en/LVMH_RA_2010_GB.pdf [hereinafter LVMH] ( listing 
Fendi as one of twelve brands in its parent company’s “fashion and leather 
goods business group”). 
 13. See Cathy Horyn & Eric Wilson, When the Label Says Lagerfeld, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 2, 2006, at G1 (“There is no bigger star in fashion today than Karl 
Lagerfeld.”); LVMH, supra note 12, at 28 (identifying Karl Lagerfeld as 
Fendi’s artistic director).  
 14. Cf. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 202–03 (1949) 
(“Throughout recorded time . . . there have been three kinds of people in the 
world, the High, the Middle, and the Low. . . . The aims of these three groups 
are entirely irreconcilable. The aim of the High is to remain where they are. 
The aim of the Middle is to change places with the High. The aim of the Low, 
when they have an aim—for it is an abiding characteristic of the Low that 
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the struggle for control of a luxury brand across the various 
cross-cutting cleavages in American society.  
The subject of this Article is the legal regime that regulates 
this struggle. Justice Sotomayor’s clients retained her to en-
force their rights under federal trademark law. These rights—
whether asserted under statutory provisions relating to simple 
trademark infringement or the more specialized provisions re-
lating to trademark counterfeiting15—are grounded in the doc-
trine of post-sale confusion.16 Trademark owners (and the 
courts that find in their favor) invoke this doctrine to satisfy 
the Lanham Act’s “likelihood of confusion” standard, which lim-
its infringement liability to conduct that is “likely to cause con-
fusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, 
connection, or association of [the defendant] with another per-
son, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of [the defend-
ant’s] goods, services, or commercial activities by another per-
son . . . .”17 
Post-sale confusion is an invention of the lower federal 
courts.18 The Supreme Court has never endorsed the theory, nor 
 
they are too much crushed by drudgery to be more than intermittently con-
scious of anything outside their daily lives—is to abolish all distinctions and 
create a society in which all men shall be equal.”). 
 15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (2006) (establishing civil liability for con-
fusing trademark uses); 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (2006) (authorizing injunctive re-
lief against trademark infringers and counterfeiters); 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)–(b) 
(2006 & Supp. 2010) (providing monetary remedies against trademark in-
fringers and heightened remedies against counterfeiters); 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a) 
(2006 & Supp. 2010) (establishing criminal liability for trafficking in counter-
feit goods). 
 16. United States v. Hon, 904 F.2d 803, 808 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that 
“likelihood of confusion” is an element of the federal counterfeiting offense, 
and holding that a likelihood of post-sale confusion can satisfy this element); 
United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347 (11th Cir. 1987); infra Part I (dis-
cussing the case law developing the concept of post-sale confusion as a basis 
for trademark infringement liability). 
 17. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); accord 15 U.S.C. § 1114. 
 18. Each of the Circuit Courts of Appeal has recognized the doctrine of 
post-sale confusion in one form or another. See IP Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler 
Co., 163 F.3d 27, 44 (1st Cir. 1998); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi 
Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 872–73 (2d Cir. 1986); Am. Home Prods. v. Barr 
Labs., 834 F.2d 368, 371 (3d Cir. 1987); Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 
816 F.2d 145, 148 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Yamin, 868 F.2d 130, 132–
33 (5th Cir. 1989); Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1245 
(6th Cir. 1991); Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 383 (7th Cir. 
1996); Insty*Bit v. Poly-Tech Indus., 95 F.3d 663, 669–72 (8th Cir. 1996); Levi 
Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 1980); Gen. Motors 
Corp. v. Urban Gorilla, 500 F.3d 1222, 1227–28 (10th Cir. 2007); Torkington, 
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even discussed it.19 But for over half a century it has been the 
key weapon in the arsenal of luxury brand owners.20 Given this 
history, post-sale confusion as a doctrine unto itself has re-
ceived surprisingly little critical attention. What literature does 
exist either characterizes post-sale confusion as merely one ex-
ample of broader trends in intellectual property,21 or else dis-
cusses the economic or philosophical implications of luxury con-
sumption without critically examining the underlying legal 
doctrine that facilitates that consumption.22 This Article makes 
a new contribution, first by critiquing the actual doctrine of 
post-sale confusion, and second by examining the relationship 
between that doctrine and what I claim is its unique (and here-
tofore overlooked) purpose: the regulation of socially expressive 
consumption. 
The first step in this project is to try to provide a coherent 
doctrinal account of the post-sale confusion cases. As it turns 
out, this is an impossible task. There is no single coherent theo-
ry of injury in post-sale confusion cases; rather, there are three. 
This Article represents the first effort to distinguish among the 
various theories of injury that arise under the label of “post-
sale confusion” and to analyze each on its own merits. As each 
of these theories suffers from serious infirmity, such an effort is 
long overdue. 
The first theory, which I label “bystander confusion,” refers 
to the following factual scenario: a defendant sells its product 
 
812 F.2d at 1352–53; Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int’l Ltd., 998 F.2d 
985, 989–90 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 19. The most recent opportunity for the Court to address the theories of 
post-sale and initial-interest confusion in trademark law ended in a denial of 
certiorari. Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, 423 F.3d 539 (6th 
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1179 (2006). 
 20. See infra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
 21. See Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 
123 HARV. L. REV. 809, 851–59 (2010) [hereinafter Beebe, Sumptuary Code] 
(considering post-sale confusion among other theories of liability as evidence 
that trademark law promotes anti-dilution and sumptuary policies); Glynn S. 
Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 404–08 (1999) (ana-
lyzing the economics of “prestige[-]good cases” and classifying them as an “ex-
ample of extending property-based trademark protection under the likelihood-
of-confusion standard”). 
 22. See generally Jonathan M. Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal 
Street: Reflections on Status Consumption, Intellectual Property, and the In-
centive Thesis, 91 VA. L. REV. 1381 (2005) (considering the economic effects on 
producers of counterfeiting); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Trademark Law and Status 
Signaling: Tattoos for the Privileged, 59 FLA. L. REV. 195 (2007) (examining 
utilitarian, Rawlsian and Lockean rationales for public subsidization of the 
luxury economy). 
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to a non-confused purchaser; observers who see the non-
confused purchaser using the defendant’s product mistake it for 
the plaintiff ’s product; and those observers draw conclusions 
from their observations that influence their future purchasing 
decisions. This theory shares similarities with more conven-
tional theories of trademark infringement, with the distinction 
that, in practice, it improperly reduces the burden on plaintiffs 
from proving a “likelihood of confusion” to proving a mere pos-
sibility of confusion.23 
The next theory of injury—which I label “downstream con-
fusion”—is implicated where there is a risk that a non-confused 
purchaser of a knockoff or altered trademarked good might give 
or resell the good to a confused recipient. This variety of post-
sale confusion flies in the face of long-standing Supreme Court 
precedent regarding contributory infringement and trademark 
law’s first-sale doctrine.24 That inconsistency, in turn, allows a 
trademark infringement plaintiff to turn a losing case into a 
winning case merely by changing the name of his claim. 
The problems inherent in bystander and downstream con-
fusion can be remedied by minor doctrinal refinements, alt-
hough those refinements might well result in discarding the 
theories as such. The more difficult issue is that both these 
theories are often invoked in tandem with (and potentially as a 
distraction from) the third theory of injury, which I label “sta-
tus confusion.” Status confusion is the legal theory that most 
often serves to justify liability against the manufacturers of 
knockoff luxury branded goods, even though the purchasers of 
those goods know full well what they are buying.25 
Status-confusion cases often invoke an argument owing its 
origins to economist and social critic Thorstein Veblen: that in-
dividuals conspicuously consume some expensive products (a 
Fendi handbag, say) to stake a claim to social status.26 As the 
courts in these cases implicitly recognize, if the symbols used to 
stake such claims are freely available to anyone, a classic prob-
lem of information economics arises: the claim loses its credibil-
ity—indeed its very meaning—due to indiscriminate use.27 In 
the United States, trademark law has solved this problem by 
propertizing the symbols that express the claim, driving them 
 
 23. See infra Part I.A.  
 24. See infra notes 71–78 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra Part I.C. 
 26. See infra Part II.A. 
 27. See infra Part II.B. 
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into a market system. By incentivizing private parties to ration 
access to such symbols, status-confusion doctrine creates the 
scarcity that is required for the symbols to have social  
meaning.28 
This is an odd role for trademark law to play. Putting to 
one side relatively novel and unsettled doctrines like dilution,29 
the conventional theoretical account of trademarks is that they 
facilitate the transfer of information between buyers and 
sellers regarding the source or quality of goods in the market-
place. In the status-confusion cases, however, information 
about the goods themselves is essentially irrelevant to all par-
ties concerned. Rather, the courts in those cases view the 
trademarks at issue as a means of transferring information 
about people: buyers consume luxury goods in view of a social 
audience for the purpose of making a statement about what 
kind of people they are (or aspire to be). For reasons that will 
become clear, I refer to the luxury trademarks that serve this 
socially expressive function (by virtue of the artificial scarcity 
that trademark law permits their owners to maintain) as “Veb-
len brands.”30 
This Article ultimately asks whether the trademark sys-
tem has any legitimate interest in creating, maintaining, and 
regulating the market for Veblen brands,31 and if so, whether 
the First Amendment permits the law of trademarks to be used 
in that way.32 Status-confusion doctrine has the direct effect of 
“restrict[ing] the speech of some elements of our society in or-
der to enhance the relative voice of others,” an exercise of gov-
ernment power which the Supreme Court has stated in other 
contexts “is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”33 By estab-
lishing a system of licenses for social expression and enforcing 
those licenses with both monetary and injunctive remedies, the 
State is entering into an expressive alliance with one (power-
ful) segment of society, in opposition to the expressive interests 
of a different (weak) segment of society. Even if this alliance of 
interests did not offend the First Amendment (and I argue it 
does), it ought to offend our democratic sensibilities. I claim 
that whatever government interest is at stake in the status 
 
 28. See infra Part II.C. 
 29. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006). 
 30. See infra Part II.C. 
 31. See infra Part III.C. 
 32. See infra Parts III.A–B. 
 33. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976). 
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confusion cases is insufficient to justify their coercive and selec-
tive restriction of social expression.34 Therefore, I propose that 
status-confusion doctrine—and post-sale confusion doctrine as 
a whole—be discarded. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I 
analyzes the case law in the area of post-sale confusion, sets 
out the three categories into which such cases fall, and cri-
tiques each category. Part II compares status-confusion theo-
ries to the dominant information economics account of trade-
mark law. This comparison reveals the fundamental theoretical 
disconnect between status confusion and the rest of trademark 
infringement law: whereas the economic theory of trademarks 
is directed at the flow of information about products, status-
confusion doctrine is directed at the flow of information about 
people. Part III turns to the policy implications of this theoreti-
cal gap. Specifically, it argues that status-confusion doctrine 
places an unjustified burden on First Amendment rights of so-
cial expression. Accordingly, the Article concludes by arguing 
that post-sale confusion doctrine should be discarded entirely, 
and replaced with a more limited doctrine focused on prevent-
ing confusion of actual or potential consumers. 
I.  CONFUSION ABOUT POST-SALE CONFUSION   
The test for trademark infringement asks whether the de-
fendant has “use[d] in commerce any word, term, name, sym-
bol, or device, or any combination thereof ” that “is likely to 
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the af-
filiation, connection, or association of [the defendant] with an-
other person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his 
or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another per-
son.”35 The classic case of infringement is diversion of trade 
through passing-off. This is the injury that arises when the de-
fendant has affixed the plaintiff ’s mark to the defendant’s 
goods and offered them for sale, causing some purchasers who 
wanted to buy the plaintiff ’s goods to buy the defendant’s goods 
instead, under the mistaken belief that they were actually 
made by the plaintiff.36 
With the evolution of trademark doctrine through common-
law development and amendments to the Lanham Act, this lim-
 
 34. See infra Part III.C. 
 35. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006). 
 36. Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1853–63 (2007). 
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ited focus on the behavior of actual purchasers at the point of 
sale (and the resulting effects on competing producers) has ex-
ploded.37 Perhaps the most seismic change was the addition of a 
dilution cause of action to the statute in 1995,38 a development 
that remains unsettled as a matter of both doctrine and theory, 
and is beyond the scope of the present discussion. But more 
subtle shifts have been occurring within the law of infringe-
ment for decades. Emblematic of this process was the 1962 
amendment that removed language limiting liability to conduct 
that confused “purchasers.”39 While the legislative history of 
the amendment makes clear that this change was meant to 
bring confusion of potential rather than merely actual purchas-
ers into the ambit of the statute,40 many courts over the past 
half-century have interpreted the change far more broadly, 
finding infringement based on nearly any kind of confusion of 
nearly any person at any time.41 
Among these expansive modern theories of infringement is 
post-sale confusion. The roots of this theory of liability are al-
most as old as the Lanham Act itself, and yet even today the 
cases are not in any kind of agreement on what post-sale confu-
sion is.42 Perhaps surprisingly, commentators have not yet rig-
 
 37. See id. at 1896–1915. See generally Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble 
with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759 (1990) (arguing that the modern expansion 
of trademark law has imposed significant costs on society). 
 38. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 
985 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (creating a 
cause of action to enjoin conduct that impairs the distinctiveness or harms the 
reputation of a famous trademark “regardless of the presence or absence 
of . . . likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception”). 
 39. Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, 76 Stat. 769, 771, 775. 
 40. H.R. REP. NO. 87-1108, at 4, 8 (1961) (“The purpose of the proposed 
change is . . . to omit the word ‘purchasers,’ since the provision actually relates 
to potential purchasers as well as to actual purchasers.”); S. REP. NO. 86-1685, 
at 4–5, 8 (1960) (same). 
 41. See, e.g., David M. Tichane, The Maturing Doctrine of Post-Sales Con-
fusion, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 399, 403–05 (1995). Numerous commentators 
have noted the seemingly unbounded expansion of the concept of “confusion” 
in trademark law, and critiqued the invocation of the 1962 amendment to the 
Lanham Act as a justification for that expansion. See, e.g., McKenna, supra 
note 36, at 1904–05, 1905 n.282; Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confu-
sion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105, 
160–61 (2005). 
 42. Some purported post-sale confusion cases do not involve post-sale con-
fusion at all. These cases invoke post-sale confusion either in passing, or else 
as a label for conduct that is better analyzed under other theories of liability. 
For example, in Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., the court used the 
language of post-sale liability to describe a fairly conventional point-of-sale 
confusion theory, apparently because the parties sold their products through 
 778 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:769 
 
orously documented this disagreement. Rather, post-sale confu-
sion is often described as a single coherent theory of trademark 
injury (albeit one that may be carelessly applied), or at worst as 
a coherent theory that serves as a pretext for pursuing unstat-
ed and divergent interests.43 As this Part will demonstrate, 
courts actually use the term “post-sale confusion” to refer to 
three conceptually distinct—though in some cases overlap-
ping44—theories of injury. I label these theories “bystander con-
fusion,” “downstream confusion,” and “status confusion.” 
A. BYSTANDER CONFUSION 
One line of post-sale confusion cases appears consistent 
with the Lanham Act’s stated purpose of extending infringe-
ment liability to confusion of potential purchasers. In its 
strongest form, the theory of these cases describes an injury—
which I will refer to as “bystander confusion”—that follows 
from a standard chain of events: 
 
separate distribution channels. 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1048, 1056–57 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001), aff ’d, 317 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 43. See, e.g., 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23.7 (4th ed. 2007) (characterizing post-sale confusion 
as a form of liability that arises when “Observers See Infringing Imitations”); 
Katya Assaf, Brand Fetishism, 43 CONN. L. REV. 83, 120–23 (2010) (character-
izing post-sale confusion as a doctrine designed to protect the information val-
ue of brands as signals of social status); Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 
21, at 852 (“The courts’ reasoning in [post-sale confusion] cases is quite reveal-
ing. Courts justify their prohibition against copying on the grounds that rarity 
and distinction should be promoted and preserved in light of the social func-
tions that they play.”); see also Lunney, supra note 21, at 404–08 (characteriz-
ing post-sale confusion as pretextually focused on speculation about observers’ 
future purchasing behavior but actually concerned over protecting the prestige 
value of plaintiffs’ trademarks); McKenna, supra note 36, at 1907–09 (same). 
 44. For example, in General Motors Corp. v. Keystone Automotive Indus-
tries, Inc., the court identified six potential injuries flowing from what it re-
ferred to as “downstream confusion,” some of which correspond to this Article’s 
definition of downstream confusion and others of which correspond to what 
this Article refers to as “bystander confusion” or “status confusion.” 453 F.3d 
351, 358 (6th Cir. 2006). In that case, the court ultimately relied on a theory of 
injury corresponding to what this Article refers to as “bystander confusion,” 
not “downstream confusion.” Compare id. at 359 (“Such confusion could dam-
age GM’s reputation for quality if the public associates any inferior attributes 
(e.g., improper fit or cracking) of Tong Yang’s grilles with GM. Other types of 
possible downstream harm, such as that resulting from a product’s reduced 
scarcity, however, are largely inapplicable to this case.”), with Part I.A, infra. 
Several post-sale confusion cases are cited in this Part as examples of more 
than one theory, precisely because the courts frequently fail to distinguish 
among them in concluding that post-sale confusion is likely. 
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 The defendant sells its product—which incorporates 
some feature or combination of features that resembles a 
protectable mark of the plaintiff—to an admittedly non-
confused consumer; 
 The consumer uses the product in view of a potential 
purchaser of the plaintiff ’s product;  
 The potential purchaser is confused as to the source of 
the observed product, misidentifying it as having origi-
nated with the plaintiff; 
 The potential purchaser, observing the defendant’s prod-
uct in use, makes some negative evaluation about the 
qualities of the observed product, mistakenly ascribing 
that evaluation to the plaintiff ’s products; 
 Under this mistaken understanding of the qualities of 
the plaintiff ’s products, the potential purchaser refrains 
from future purchases of the plaintiff ’s products, and po-
tentially recommends that others do likewise.45 
It should be noted at the outset that the bystander confu-
sion theory is entirely consistent with broadly accepted policy 
justifications for trademark enforcement. These include the in-
formation-forcing policies espoused by the “Chicago School” of 
law and economics that dominate modern trademark theory,46 
as well as more traditional and limited policies against unfair 
 
 45. See, e.g., CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Eng’g, 267 F.3d 660, 683 (7th Cir. 
2001); Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int’l Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 989–90 
(Fed. Cir. 1993); Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 816 F.2d 145, 148 (4th 
Cir. 1987). 
 46. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 
UCLA L. REV. 621, 623–24 (2004) [hereinafter Beebe, Semiotic Analysis] (not-
ing that the influence and acceptance of the Chicago School’s approach is 
“nearly total” in American trademark law); William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269–
70 (1987) (arguing that trademark enforcement ensures the integrity of infor-
mation in the marketplace, thereby giving producers the means to reap the 
reputational rewards of high quality and giving consumers the ability to make 
better-informed purchasing decisions). Of course, notwithstanding the general 
dominance of Chicago School theory, other theories of trademark law are ex-
tant—including Professor Beebe’s semiotic account and more overt property-
based accounts grounded in deontologically inspired theories of misappropria-
tion. See generally Beebe, Semiotic Analysis, supra (arguing that economic 
analyses of trademark law are necessarily incomplete without an accompany-
ing semiotic analysis); Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the 
Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547 (2006) (describing 
the historical development of misappropriation-based theories of trademark 
rights). 
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diversion of trade.47 Should the chain of events described above 
occur, consumers might rely on inaccurate information in mak-
ing purchasing decisions, and honest producers of quality goods 
may lose sales as a result—both injuries trademark law rightly 
seeks to prevent. It is thus little surprise that the commenta-
tors who speak favorably of post-sale confusion typically de-
scribe it in terms of bystander confusion.48 However, as these 
same commentators often note, courts can be sloppy in their 
analysis of a bystander-confusion claim, extending liability to 
conduct that does not threaten to injure either consumers or 
producers.49 
The typical path to such expansion of liability is the pre-
sumption that the entire parade of events described above will 
follow whenever the first of them occurs. The fact that some po-
tential future purchaser of the plaintiff ’s product could observe 
a purchaser of the defendant’s product, could misidentify the 
plaintiff as the source of that product, and could form infer-
ences about the plaintiff ’s goods is supposed by some courts to 
establish that actionable confusion is likely.50 As Professor Rob-
 
 47. See generally McKenna, supra note 36 (describing the relationship be-
tween traditional trade-diversion and modern trademark doctrines). 
 48. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 46, at 607–08 (“Protecting against post-sale 
confusion can serve information transmission policies. If defendant’s product 
is inferior to plaintiff ’s, for example, potential customers might be dissuaded 
from even trying to buy plaintiff ’s product after seeing defendant’s inferior 
product with the plaintiff ’s mark and wrongly believing it to be the plain-
tiff ’s.”); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile 
Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 491 (2005) (“[E]ven though the 
buyer is not confused, others might be. . . . This in turn can cause harm—if 
people see Rolexes that don’t tell time well, or break, they may mistakenly at-
tribute the shoddy quality of the counterfeit goods to the trademark owner.”); 
Anne M. McCarthy, Note, The Post-Sale Confusion Doctrine: Why the General 
Public Should Be Included in the Likelihood of Confusion Inquiry, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 3337, 3356–58 (1999). 
 49. Bone, supra note 46, at 608 (“In some of the broadest post-sale confu-
sion decisions, however, there is no genuine risk that defendant’s product will 
be perceived as inferior. In these cases, liability is difficult to square with the 
information transmission function of the mark, and goodwill appropriation of-
ten plays a prominent justificatory role.”); cf. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 48 
(“It is important not to assume that any use of a logo will inevitably confuse 
viewers after the sale, however.”). 
 50. See, e.g., Payless, 998 F.2d at 989 (“Reebok contended that such confu-
sion occurs, for example, when a consumer observes someone wearing a pair of 
Payless accused shoes and believes that the shoes are Reebok’s. As a conse-
quence, the consumer may attribute any perceived inferior quality of Payless 
shoes to Reebok, thus damaging Reebok’s reputation and image. . . . We agree 
with Reebok that the district court abused its discretion in failing to adequate-
ly consider the extent of such post-sale confusion.”); Lois Sportswear U.S.A., 
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ert Denicola notes, “the essentially predictive nature of the like-
lihood of confusion standard permits the accommodation of in-
terests attributable to a host of divergent social and economic 
prejudices.”51 Insofar as this is true even of traditional point-of-
sale confusion analysis, the chain of inferences required to find 
bystander confusion only compounds the problem. 
The danger of piling on layers of unsupported inference in 
bystander-confusion cases is particularly acute given that 
courts have made little effort to distinguish the factual predi-
cates of a likelihood of post-sale confusion from those of a like-
lihood of point-of-sale confusion.52 Thus, bystander-confusion 
theories are frequently found shoehorned into the analysis of a 
single factor in the multifactor likelihood-of-confusion balanc-
 
Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 872–73 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[P]ost-sale 
confusion would involve consumers seeing appellant’s jeans outside of the re-
tail store, perhaps being worn by a passer-by. The confusion the Act seeks to 
prevent in this context is that a consumer seeing the familiar stitching pattern 
will associate the jeans with appellee and that association will influence his 
buying decisions.”); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 822 
(9th Cir. 1980) (“Wrangler’s use of its projecting label is likely to cause confu-
sion among prospective purchasers who carry even an imperfect recollection of 
Strauss’s mark and who observe Wrangler’s projecting label after the point of 
sale.”); Cartier v. Aaron Faber Inc., 396 F. Supp. 2d 356, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(“Individuals viewing the watches on a purchaser’s wrist would be misled as to 
the true nature of the watch’s craftsmanship, and any effect such identifica-
tion might have on Cartier’s goodwill with the public is actionable.”); Car-
Freshener Corp. v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 145, 153 (N.D.N.Y. 
2004); see also Lunney, supra note 21, at 407 (“This type of confusion comes 
very near the focus of deception-based trademark because it concerns incorrect 
information that may influence consumer-buying decisions. But courts have 
typically offered only the barest possibility of such confusion, and it is difficult 
to believe that such confusion would actually prove very widespread, particu-
larly as consumers became aware of the need to separate more precisely imita-
tors from the original. The proffering of this rationale seems, therefore, little 
more than a rote recital, intended to raise the specter of possible confusion and 
to create some tenuous link to trademark’s deception-based foundations.”). 
 51. Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implica-
tions of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 
WIS. L. REV. 158, 162 n.18 (emphasis added). 
 52. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Keystone Auto. Indus., Inc., 453 F.3d 
351, 356–58 (6th Cir. 2006) (“To assess the likelihood of downstream confu-
sion, we first apply the eight-factor test [used to determine point-of-sale confu-
sion] and then discuss the potential harm from the influx of Tong Yang’s 
grilles into the stream of commerce. . . although the eight-factor test is argu-
ably less important in assessing downstream confusion than point-of-sale con-
fusion.”); Lois Sportswear, 799 F.2d at 873 (“The Polaroid factors therefore 
must be applied with an eye toward post-sale confusion . . . .” (citing Polaroid 
Corp. v. Polorad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 493 (2d Cir. 1961))). 
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ing analysis applicable to point-of-sale confusion claims,53 or 
tacked on to the end of such analysis.54 In neither case, howev-
er, do the courts in question discuss any facts beyond those al-
ready reviewed in the point-of-sale confusion analysis that 
might be probative of the likelihood of the latter links in the 
causal chain of the bystander confusion injury.55 In short, cur-
rent doctrine encourages courts to speculate about the ripples 
that might spread through the stream of commerce and, ulti-
mately, through society, from an admittedly non-confused  
purchase. 
Some courts, to their credit, appear to be attuned to this 
danger. The Seventh Circuit has found such causal speculation 
by a district court to be reversible error, albeit on particularly 
compelling facts.56 Similarly, the Third Circuit has affirmed the 
denial of injunctive relief on the basis of an uncontested district 
court finding that the accused goods were not of observably 
lower quality than the plaintiff ’s authentic products.57 But 
counterexamples abound. To take one colorful example, in 
Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Canner, the court admitted that it 
“can only speculate as to the forms such cheapening or dilution 
 
 53. Often the factor in question is related to consumer sophistication, and 
the analysis amounts to little more than an excuse for refusing to hold this 
factor in the defendant’s favor despite the admitted sophistication of the actu-
al and potential purchasers of the plaintiff ’s products. See, e.g., Acxiom Corp. 
v. Axiom, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 478, 497 (D. Del. 1998) (“The ‘sophisticated pur-
chaser’ rationale generally weighs against the likelihood of confusion. Courts, 
however, may consider pre-sale and post-sale confusion when evaluating [con-
sumer sophistication].”); Omega, S.A. v. S & N Jewelry Inc., No. 92 Civ. 3656 
(PKL), 1992 WL 142746, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 1992). 
 54. E.g., Gen. Motors Corp., 453 F.3d at 356. 
 55. See, e.g., supra notes 50–54. 
 56. Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(“The proper examination is not whether some people viewing clamshells in 
industry plants might be confused, but rather whether consumers in the mar-
ket for clamshells are likely to be confused. . . . Although the district court 
found that plant tours were given to ‘potential customers’ from foreign coun-
tries, there is no evidence in the record that anyone other than the twelve do-
mestic companies has ever purchased, or even expressed an intention to pur-
chase, a clamshell. A determination that the market for clamshells includes 
these foreign visitors would be complete speculation.”); see also Perini Corp. v. 
Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 128 (4th Cir. 1990) (reversing grant of 
summary judgment to the plaintiff and stating that “[i]n order for a likelihood 
of confusion among the public, but not typical purchasers [of the parties’ con-
struction services], to provide the basis for a trade name infringement action, 
it must be shown that public confusion will adversely affect the plaintiff ’s abil-
ity to control his reputation among its laborers, lenders, investors, or other 
group with whom the plaintiff interacts”). 
 57. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Daffy’s, Inc., 354 F.3d 228, 234–35 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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[of the Rolex brand] might take and the injuries that might en-
sue,” but imposed liability based precisely on such speculation, 
including the possibility that security guards at an airport 
might be “confused” should a counterfeit gold watch set off a 
metal detector.58 Similarly, in In re Artic Electronics Co., the 
Trademark Trials and Appeal Board denied a trademark regis-
tration on the theory that the registration opponent’s coin and 
bill change machines could hypothetically malfunction at an 
arcade, causing children to doubt the “workmanship” of the ap-
plicant’s video games bearing the same mark and therefore re-
fuse to play them.59 In other cases, a chain of events culminat-
ing in a trademark injury appears to be assumed sub silentio.60  
In short, the current state of bystander-confusion doctrine 
is exactly backward. The conclusion that a trademark owner is 
injured by non-confused purchases of a similarly marked, con-
figured, or packaged product is often assumed by courts specu-
lating about the causal chain of bystander confusion, rather 
than proven by trademark infringement plaintiffs. Only where 
a defendant can point to particularly compelling facts, such as 
the idiosyncratic composition and sophistication of the plain-
tiff ’s consumer base, or the comparatively close quality of the 
parties’ goods, will courts entertain the possibility that the 
causal chain might fail to materialize.61 The cumulative effect 
of judges’ filling a doctrinal vacuum with their own speculation 
and departing from that speculation only upon a persuasive 
showing from the defendant, is tantamount to shifting the bur-
den of proof on likelihood of confusion—the most important el-
ement in a trademark infringement plaintiff ’s case-in-chief—to 
 
 58. 645 F. Supp. 484, 493 n.3, 495 (S.D. Fla. 1986). 
 59. 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 836, 837–38 (T.T.A.B. 1983). That the applicant 
still desired the registration despite the fact that it, rather than the registra-
tion opponent, would be the party injured by this hypothesized confusion did 
not seem to enter into the board’s analysis. 
 60. Typically the analysis begins and ends with an observation that an 
observer might be unable to distinguish between the parties’ marks in the 
post-sale context; what the results of this might be, and how those results 
might injure the plaintiff is typically left unstated—as is the factual basis for 
believing those results are likely to occur. See, e.g., supra note 50. Cases using 
such underdeveloped post-sale confusion theories in service of a merchandis-
ing right are also typical, though the literature on the merchandising right has 
addressed this issue thoroughly. See, e.g., Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. 
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1077–78 (9th Cir. 2006) (granting 
summary judgment to automobile manufacturers in a suit against a retailer 
who sold car accessories adorned with manufacturers’ logos). See generally 
Dogan & Lemley, supra note 48. 
 61. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
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the defendant. No lesser authority than the Supreme Court has 
recently, specifically, and unanimously warned against precisely 
this form of burden-shifting in trademark infringement cases.62 
These infirmities of bystander-confusion doctrine are cer-
tainly remediable. The most obvious solution is to take those 
facts that courts have cited in rejecting a bystander-confusion 
claim and put the burden of establishing contradictory facts on 
the plaintiff. Thus, rather than using the hypothetical possibil-
ity of post-sale confusion as a reason to ignore the sophistica-
tion of the plaintiff ’s customers,63 a court might put the burden 
on the bystander confusion plaintiff to prove that its actual or 
potential customers are likely to be in a position to observe the 
defendant’s goods in use by others, and moreover that they are 
the type of consumers whose purchasing behaviors are likely to 
be influenced by such observations (as opposed to, for example, 
advertising, point-of-sale inspection, or third-party reviews).64 
Similarly, a bystander-confusion plaintiff might be subjected to 
the burden of establishing that any quality difference between 
the parties’ products would be detectable to a potential custom-
er of the plaintiff who observes the defendant’s product in use 
by others, and that the types of consumers who would be capa-
ble of detecting such a difference under those circumstances 
would also be the type who would be likely to attribute such dif-
ferences to the plaintiff.65 Importantly, these doctrinal innova-
 
 62. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 
111, 117–21 (2004). 
 63. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 64. See supra note 56 and accompanying text; cf. Hermès Int’l v. Lederer 
de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 212, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“While 
Hermès’s potential high-end customers may be confused in the post-sale con-
text, these highly sophisticated purchasers will not be confused at the point of 
sale.”), aff ’d in part on other grounds, rev’d in part, 219 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 
2000). 
 65. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. Importantly, combining 
these two criteria recognizes that there are differing classes of consumers that 
might draw different conclusions from seeing the same product in use, particu-
larly in the markets for luxury goods that are so often the subject of post-sale 
confusion claims. See Jonah Berger & Morgan Ward, Subtle Signals of Incon-
spicuous Consumption, 37 J. CONSUMER RES. 555, 562–63 (2010) (demonstrat-
ing that luxury goods often use “subtle signals” to indicate quality to a narrow 
band of consumers); Young Jee Han et al., First Impressions: Status Signaling 
Using Brand Prominence 28–32 (USC Marshall Sch. of Bus., Working Paper 
MKT 15-09, Apr. 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1262479 (pro-
posing a classification system for different levels of consumer brand signaling 
sophistication). It is also consistent with some cases that declined to impose 
post-sale confusion liability. See, e.g., Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith 
Guitars, 423 F.3d 539, 552–53 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Gibson argues that . . . [o]n a 
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tions do not necessarily require any dramatic change in courts’ 
analysis of trademark infringement claims; they merely require 
courts to be faithful to their own commands to apply the likeli-
hood-of-confusion factors (such as consumer sophistication or 
product quality) with sensitivity to the particular type of confu-
sion-based injury asserted by the plaintiff.66 
B. DOWNSTREAM CONFUSION 
A second species of post-sale confusion is grounded on the 
theory that a defendant’s (admittedly non-confused) customers 
might gift or resell the defendant’s goods in a secondary market 
in a way that will confuse purchasers or recipients of the goods 
in that secondary market. In some such cases, the defendant is 
selling admitted replicas of the plaintiff ’s goods;67 in others, the 
defendant has acquired the genuine article and modified it in 
some way.68 In either case, the injury on which liability is 
grounded is not directly inflicted by the defendant (who sells to 
a non-confused purchaser), but is rather presumed to be inflict-
ed further down the stream of commerce by one of the defend-
ant’s customers. I will refer to this theory of injury as “down-
stream confusion.” What is surprising about the downstream-
confusion cases is not that they consider confusing sales or gra-
tuitous transfers in a secondary market harmful to the trade-
mark owner and to the public—that much is uncontroversial. 
 
distant stage, a smoky bar, wannabe musicians [might think a Paul Reed 
Smith guitar in the hands of a famous musician is actually a Gibson]. . . . As 
Gibson concedes that PRS produces high-quality guitars, we do not believe 
such an occurrence could result in confusion harmful to Gibson. If a budding 
musician sees an individual he or she admires playing a PRS guitar, but be-
lieves it to be a Gibson guitar, the logical result would be that the budding 
musician would go out and purchase a Gibson guitar. Gibson is helped, rather 
than harmed, by any such confusion.” (citations omitted)). Indeed, this point 
has been conceded even by some courts that do impose post-sale confusion lia-
bility. See, e.g., Hermès Int’l, 219 F.3d at 109 (“In fact, high-end consumers 
may be less confused than the general public in the post-sale context because 
many of them will be aware of the existence of copies.”). 
 66. See, e.g., supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 67. A.T. Cross Co. v. Jonathan Bradley Pens, Inc., 470 F.2d 689, 692 (2d 
Cir. 1972) (“The last straw was the recent mailing, as bold an attempt at per-
suading purchasers that their donees would think they were receiving Cross 
pens as could be imagined.”). 
 68. Cartier v. Aaron Faber Inc., 396 F. Supp. 2d 356, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); 
Montblanc-Simplo GMBH v. Staples, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 231, 233, vacated, 
175 F. Supp. 2d 95, 95 (D. Mass. 2001); cf. Saks & Co. v. Hill, 843 F. Supp. 
620, 623–24 (S.D. Cal. 1993) (speculating that defendant, operator of a thrift 
store called “Sacks Thrift Avenue,” might one day resell a garment bearing 
plaintiff ’s label, thereby causing post-sale confusion). 
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Rather, what is surprising is that these cases give almost no at-
tention to the well-established doctrines that are addressed to 
such an injury: contributory infringement liability and the 
first-sale doctrine. 
In Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., the 
Supreme Court limited contributory trademark infringement 
liability to those cases where the defendant “intentionally in-
duces another to infringe a trademark, or . . . continues to sup-
ply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is 
engaging in trademark infringement . . . .”69 Recent applica-
tions of this standard reaffirm that generalized knowledge of a 
possibility of confusing secondary market sales is insufficient to 
ground a secondary infringement claim.70 Whether the defend-
ant’s goods are genuine but modified goods or admitted repli-
cas, treating downstream confusion (that is, confusion of the 
customers of the defendant’s customers) as primary rather than 
secondary infringement eliminates this intent element of the 
plaintiff ’s case, lowering its burden merely by rephrasing the 
nature of its claim. Given that the Supreme Court itself an-
nounced the intent element of contributory infringement 
claims71 but has never passed on the legitimacy of post-sale con-
fusion,72 this expansion of secondary liability seems particularly 
inappropriate. 
Moreover, with respect to goods that originated with the 
plaintiff but are later modified and resold by the defendant 
(though not with respect to replicas), the first-sale doctrine 
would seem to be directly applicable. Trademark law’s first-sale 
doctrine—developed by the Supreme Court in Prestonettes, Inc. 
v. Coty 73 and Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders74—holds 
that the resale of a genuine trademarked product by its pur-
chaser is not trademark infringement so long as the reseller’s 
customers are made aware that any differences in quality be-
 
 69. 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). 
 70. See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(“For contributory trademark infringement liability to lie, a service provider 
must have more than a general knowledge or reason to know that its service is 
being used to sell counterfeit goods. Some contemporary knowledge of which 
particular listings are infringing or will infringe in the future is necessary.”), 
remanded, No. 04 Civ. 4607 (RJS), 2010 WL 3733894 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010). 
 71. Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 854. 
 72. Supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text. 
 73. 264 U.S. 359 (1924). 
 74. 331 U.S. 125 (1947). 
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tween the original and the resold product are attributable to 
the reseller75 and the goods are not so changed from their origi-
nal state “that it would be a misnomer to call the article by its 
original name . . . .”76 This principle has been extensively devel-
oped in the Circuit Courts of Appeal in cases involving both 
new and used resale goods, whether modified, refurbished, or 
repackaged.77 Yet only recently has any of those courts directly 
considered the first-sale doctrine’s applicability to a claim of 
post-sale confusion arising from a defendant’s sale of modified 
goods that were legitimately purchased from the plaintiff. 
The Ninth Circuit addressed this issue in its most recent 
opinion in the long-running Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. 
Volkswagen of America, Inc. litigation.78 Though the case 
sounds in bystander confusion rather than in downstream con-
fusion, it is the best evidence we have on how courts might 
manage the interaction of any post-sale confusion claim with a 
first-sale defense. Au-Tomotive Gold purchased genuine “badg-
es” consisting of the Volkswagen trademark from Volkswagen 
dealers and incorporated the badges into its “marquee license 
plates”—in some instances after gold-plating them.79 Au-
Tomotive Gold’s packaging included labels explaining “that the 
plates were not produced or sponsored by Volkswagen.”80 The 
Ninth Circuit rejected Au-Tomotive Gold’s first-sale defense to 
 
 75. Champion Spark Plug, 331 U.S. at 130 (“The result is, of course, that 
the second-hand dealer gets some advantage from the trade mark. But under 
the rule of Prestonettes . . . that is wholly permissible so long as the manufac-
turer is not identified with the inferior qualities of the product resulting from 
wear and tear or the reconditioning by the dealer. Full disclosure gives the 
manufacturer all the protection to which he is entitled.”); Prestonettes, 264 
U.S. at 368–69 (“The defendant of course by virtue of its ownership had a right 
to compound or change what it bought, to divide either the original or the 
modified product, and to sell it so divided. The plaintiff could not prevent or 
complain of its stating the nature of the component parts and the source from 
which they were derived if it did not use the trade mark in doing so. . . . If the 
defendant’s rebottling the plaintiff ’s perfume deteriorates it and the public is 
adequately informed who does the rebottling, the public, with or without the 
plaintiff ’s assistance, is likely to find it out.”). 
 76. Champion Spark Plug, 331 U.S. at 129. 
 77. See, e.g., Zino Davidoff S.A. v. CVS Corp., 571 F.3d 238, 243 (2d Cir. 
2009); Nitro Leisure Prods. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1361–65 (Fed. Cir. 
2003); Davidoff & Cie, S.A. v. P.L.D. Int’l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297, 1301–02 (11th 
Cir. 2001); Enesco Corp. v. Price/Costco Inc., 146 F.3d 1083, 1085–86 (9th Cir. 
1998); Warner-Lambert Co. v. Northside Dev. Corp., 86 F.3d 3, 6 (2d Cir. 
1996). 
 78. 603 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 79. Au-Tomotive Gold, 603 F.3d at 1135. 
 80. Id. 
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Volkswagen’s post-sale confusion claim based largely on the 
court’s assertion that no other court had yet entertained the de-
fense in such a case.81 In fact, this was not entirely accurate: 
the Au-Tomotive Gold court itself relied heavily on a prior 
Ninth Circuit case, Rolex Watch,82 that included a thorough 
analysis under Champion Spark Plug, and had grounded liabil-
ity on its conclusion that the defendant’s refurbishment of 
Rolex watches had so changed the watches from their original 
state as to “result in [] new product[s],” such that allowing 
them to be resold under the Rolex name would “be likely to 
cause confusion to subsequent or downstream purchasers, as 
well as to persons observing the product.”83 
The Au-Tomotive Gold panel went on to disparage its own 
first-sale-doctrine precedent in order to find in Volkswagen’s 
favor.84 Just a few paragraphs after citing Enesco Corp. v. 
Price/Costco, Inc., which had held that “[t]he critical issue [in 
determining whether secondary market resale of a product that 
originated with the trademark owner is actionable] is whether 
the public is likely to be confused as a result of the lack of quali-
ty control,”85 the panel asserted that the quality of a modified 
resold genuine product is irrelevant in post-sale confusion cases 
because “likelihood of confusion, not quality control, is the key-
stone of trademark law.”86 In short, where post-sale confusion 
 
 81. Id. at 1138 (“Auto Gold cannot point to any case in which a court has 
held that the ‘first-sale’ doctrine applies when there is a likelihood of post-
purchase confusion.”). 
 82. Id. at 1137–39. 
 83. Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Michel Co., 179 F.3d 704, 707–10 (9th Cir. 
1999). Two recent district court opinions arrived at similar conclusions. Car-
tier, Inc. v. Aaron Faber Inc., 396 F. Supp. 2d 356, 359–61 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(holding that where genuine steel Cartier watches that had been polished and 
bejeweled to resemble more expensive gold Cartier watches, retention of the 
Cartier mark deceived rather than informed consumers as to the source of the 
product); Cartier, Inc. v. Symbolix, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 2d 354, 360–61 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) (same). Two earlier Court of Appeals cases deployed similar reasoning to 
arrive at similar results, again in cases involving luxury watches. Rolex Watch 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Meece, 158 F.3d 816, 825–26 (5th Cir. 1998); Bulova Watch Co. 
v. Allerton Co., 328 F.2d 20, 23–24 (7th Cir. 1964). Each of these cases pre-
sents a complex mix of the three varieties of post-sale confusion identified in 
this Part. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 84. 603 F.3d at 1139–40. 
 85. Enesco Corp. v. Price/Costco Inc., 146 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(emphasis added), cited in Au-Tomotive Gold, 603 F.3d at 1136–37. 
 86. Au-Tomotive Gold, 603 F.3d at 1139 (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. 
v. Gen. Circuit Breakers & Elec. Supply Inc., 106 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted)). To be fair, there is some prece-
dent that could be extended to support this argument, but it does not come 
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doctrine and the first-sale doctrine collide, the Ninth Circuit 
has held that it will enforce the former and ignore the latter. 
If the modification and resale of a legitimately purchased, 
authentically branded good can give rise to liability under a 
post-sale confusion theory without regard to the quality con-
trols maintained by the reseller or the disclosures to the re-
seller’s retail customers, it is difficult to see what remains of 
the first-sale doctrine. Given the long and authoritative pedi-
gree of that doctrine, it once again seems inappropriate to wave 
it away simply by reframing apposite factual scenarios as post-
sale confusion cases. In sum, by circumventing both the first-
sale doctrine and the intent element of contributory liability 
doctrine, downstream-confusion claims generate the same ill 
effects as bystander-confusion claims, to wit: they relieve 
trademark plaintiffs of a substantial part of their burden of 
proof. 
These infirmities of downstream-confusion doctrine, like 
those of bystander-confusion, can be remedied doctrinally. 
Moreover, courts already possess the tools to accomplish this 
task. Specifically, by simply applying their own precedents (and 
the binding precedent of Inwood Labs, Prestonettes, and Cham-
pion Spark Plug) where such precedents are applicable, courts 
could ensure that liability is only imposed against defendants 
who are actually likely to create relevant confusion in second-
ary markets. Significantly, this shift might not change the re-
sults of many downstream-confusion cases. For example, the 
defendant in A.T. Cross Co. v. Jonathan Bradley Pens, Inc. 
marketed its pens as suitable for duping donees of the defend-
ant’s customers into thinking they had received genuine Cross 
pens.87 Such marketing activities would certainly satisfy the 
Inwood Labs standard of “intentionally induc[ing] another to 
infringe a trademark . . . .” 88 Similarly, in Rolex Watch U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Meece, a wholesaler used unauthorized and inferior 
parts to “convert” steel Rolex watches into gold watches which 
he then marketed—with full disclosure—to retailers (presuma-
bly to be resold to retail customers under the Rolex mark with-
 
from the Ninth Circuit. In Nitro Leisure Prods. v. Acushnet Co., the Federal 
Circuit held that the “quality control” or “material differences” tests for de-
termining whether resale of a product originating with plaintiff is likely to 
cause confusion apply only to new, repackaged goods, not to used, refurbished 
goods. 341 F.3d 1356, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 87. 470 F.2d 689, 692 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 88. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). 
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out disclosure).89 In such a case, faithful application of Champi-
on Spark Plug and its progeny to a well-developed record 
should lead the defendant to be held liable. For other cases, 
however, a doctrinal shift might well change the outcome. It is 
therefore important to consider one final alternative theory of 
liability that courts (including the Au-Tomotive Gold court) 
raise in post-sale confusion cases. 
C. STATUS CONFUSION 
Assuming that the Ninth Circuit did not intend to do away 
with the first-sale doctrine, its characterization of the motiva-
tions of buyers and sellers of branded goods suggests a concern 
distinct from both the bystander-confusion and downstream- 
confusion theories of injury—a concern over free-riding. The 
Au-Tomotive Gold court declared that a reseller who purchases 
a branded product from authorized channels “is not purchasing 
the trademark. Rather, the [reseller] is purchasing a product 
that has been trademarked.”90 The reseller’s customer, on the 
other hand, wants the brand itself: “the Rolex name. . . . a true 
Rolex watch.”91 Given these motivations, the court surmised, 
“[i]f a producer profits from a trademark because of post-
purchase confusion about the product’s origin, the producer is, 
to that degree, a free-rider.”92 But in setting up this distinction 
without ever asking what it is about a branded good that 
makes it “true,” or about a profit that makes it “free-rid[ing],” 
the Ninth Circuit ultimately begged the question.93 
 
 89. 158 F.3d at 818–20. 
 90. 603 F.3d at 1138. 
 91. See id. at 1139. 
 92. Id. at 1138. 
 93. Other courts considering similar fact patterns have similarly ducked 
the issue. See cases cited supra note 85. At least one such court appeared to be 
foreshadowing the Au-Tomotive Gold court in treating the “true” mark itself as 
the product at issue. In Cartier, Inc. v. Symbolix, Inc., the court asked whether 
the defendant’s modifications to the plaintiff ’s product rendered the continued 
application of the plaintiff ’s mark to the product misleading under Champion 
Spark Plug. Cartier, Inc. v. Symbolix, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 2d 354, 359–60 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Plaintiffs have produced evidence indicating that Saleh in-
tentionally reconditioned the watches in such a manner as to make the watch-
es appear ‘exactly the same’ as the gold Cartier Tank Française model. In this 
sense, the changes defendants made to the watches are not the sort of simple 
reconditioning or repairs performed in Champion Spark Plug, but are unau-
thorized, substantial modifications resulting in ‘new construction[s].’ . . . The 
alterations are made with the precise intent to deceive the public (though not 
the buyer) that the altered product is actually plaintiffs’ higher-end, white 
gold, diamond-encrusted Cartier Tank Française watch.” (citations omitted)). 
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Other post-sale confusion cases shed more light on the is-
sue. It is no accident that the Au-Tomotive Gold court invoked 
Rolex watches in disposing of the matter before it; the source of 
post-sale confusion doctrine lies in such extravagant luxuries, 
and in fears of free-riding on the social cachet they represent. 
Before post-sale confusion even had a name, it was invoked to 
prevent the sale of knockoff luxury goods. The rationale behind 
these cases is markedly different from that of other forms of 
post-sale confusion. In the first such case, Mastercrafters Clock 
& Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, 
Inc., the Second Circuit explained the theory of injury in blunt 
terms: 
[S]ome customers would buy [the junior user’s] cheaper clock for the 
purpose of acquiring the prestige gained by displaying what many vis-
itors at the customers’ homes would regard as a prestigious article. 
[The junior user’s] wrong thus consisted of the fact that such a visitor 
would be likely to assume that the clock was [genuine].94 
Because it is undisputed that the purchaser of the imitation 
good does not think he is purchasing the genuine good, once 
again the basis for infringement liability must be confusion 
other than point-of-sale purchaser confusion. In Mastercrafters, 
such confusion was found not in the marketplace, but in the 
home, specifically when the purchaser consumes the good in 
view of a social audience.95 This theory of injury, which I will 
refer to as “status confusion,” is thus the historic source of what 
we know today as post-sale confusion. 
Status confusion is the underlying theory in what Profes-
sor Barton Beebe has called “a surprisingly persistent line of 
cases, all involving high-status goods.”96 These goods range 
from cigars97 and watches98 to handbags99 and award statues.100 
 
 94. Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le 
Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955).  
 95. See id. 
 96. Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, at 855. 
 97. Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1650, 
1689 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“The use of an almost-identical typeface on the band on-
ly adds to the possibility that the consumer may acquire the prestige of smok-
ing a Cuban [cigar] without actually purchasing one.”), rev’d in part on other 
grounds, 399 F.3d 462 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 98. Cartier, Inc. v. Symbolix, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 175, 182–83 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006); see also Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Michel Co., 179 F.3d 704, 713 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (finding the defendant’s alterations to genuine Rolex watches “so 
basic that they result[ed] in different product[s]”). 
 99. See Hermès Int’l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 109 
(2d Cir. 2000).  
 100. See Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Sci. v. Creative House Promotions, 
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The argument of these cases makes clear what the Ninth Cir-
cuit was referring to in Au-Tomotive Gold when it discussed a 
purchaser’s motivations for wanting a “true” luxury good. Put 
simply, these cases presume that purchasers of such goods are 
not purchasing a level of product quality associated with the 
brand, but are rather purchasing the social status that is ac-
corded to those who possess products bearing the brand. 
The confusion, and thus the injury, that arises in status-
confusion cases are different in kind from the injury in other 
post-sale confusion cases, or for that matter any other type of 
trademark infringement case. In the clearest statement of the 
theory, the Second Circuit in Hermès International v. Lederer 
de Paris Fifth Avenue, Inc. identified two injuries flowing from 
status confusion.101 The first injury is visited not on the owner 
of the mark, but on its customers: “[T]he purchaser of an origi-
nal is harmed by the widespread existence of knockoffs because 
the high value of originals, which derives in part from their 
scarcity, is lessened.”102 The second injury falls not on the mark 
owner, nor even on its customers, but on the public at large: “A 
loss [to the public] occurs when a sophisticated buyer purchases 
a knockoff and passes it off to the public as the genuine article, 
thereby confusing the viewing public and achieving the status 
of owning the genuine article at a knockoff price.”103 
A comparison of these injuries with the injuries in other 
post-sale confusion cases reveals an important distinction: ob-
servers in bystander-confusion cases may form mistaken im-
pressions about the quality of the senior user’s products, and 
observers in downstream-confusion cases may form mistaken 
impressions about the source of products they might acquire in 
secondary markets. In either case, consumers might make pur-
chasing decisions that would make both them and the mark 
owner worse-off than either would have been absent the confu-
sion. But the relevant observers in status-confusion cases are 
not even argued to be potential purchasers, and do not appear 
to be confused about product quality at all. Rather, they are 
confused about the consumers of the products, and specifically 
about who is entitled to the high social status that the brand is 
supposed to impart.104 
 
Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1455–56 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 101. 219 F.3d 104. 
 102. Id. at 108. 
 103. Id. at 109. 
 104. While the Hermès court tossed in a point-of-sale confusion theory and 
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If the injury in the status-confusion cases is that past pur-
chasers of genuine luxury goods who must now abide a lower 
degree of exclusivity, or that unspecified observers who are un-
able to reliably determine the social status of the purchasers of 
certain branded goods, the next obvious question is: who cares? 
Or more specifically, why should trademark law care? Either 
supposed injury would seem to be irrelevant to the widely ac-
cepted economic policies underlying trademark law—to lower 
consumer search costs and provide an incentive to the efficient 
production of quality products.105 Neither would seem to present 
any possibility that a consumer would be duped into buying 
something he didn’t want, or that a producer would lose a 
sale.106 Some alternative theoretical justification for status-
 
a downstream confusion theory for good measure, the former was flatly incon-
sistent with the lower court’s finding that consumers were not likely to be con-
fused at the point of sale, and the latter suffered not only from the inherent 
doctrinal weakness of downstream confusion arguments generally but also 
from a complete absence of evidentiary support given the sophistication of 
consumers of luxury goods. Compare id. at 108 (“The creation of confusion in 
the post-sale context can be harmful in that if there are too many knockoffs in 
the market, sales of the originals may decline because the public is fearful that 
what they are purchasing may not be an original. Furthermore, the public 
may be deceived in the resale market if it requires expertise to distinguish be-
tween an original and a knockoff.”), with Hermès Int’l v. Lederer de Paris 
Fifth Ave., Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 212, 225–26 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“Hermès has of-
fered no proof that defendants deceptively attempted to ‘pass off ’ or ‘palm off ’ 
their products as genuine Hermès. In all instances in which Hermès’ investi-
gators asked defendants’ salespersons the source of the products, the salesper-
sons never responded ‘Hermès’, but rather openly acknowledged that the 
products were Hermès ‘knock-offs’ or copies. . . . While Hermès’s potential 
high-end customers may be confused in the post-sale context, these highly so-
phisticated purchasers will not be confused at the point of sale.”), aff ’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 219 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 105. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Eco-
nomic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269–70 (1987). I take up the question 
whether status confusion might cause injury to some other interest that 
trademark law might serve in Part III.D, infra. 
 106. See McKenna, supra note 36, at 1858–60 (arguing that trademark pro-
tection has traditionally been deployed to guard against diversion or loss of 
sales); Renée Ann Richardson Gosline, The Real Value of Fakes: Dynamic 
Symbolic Boundaries in Socially Embedded Consumption 18 (May 2009) (un-
published D.B.A. dissertation, Harvard Business Sch.), available at 
http://gradworks.umi.com/3371273.pdf (finding, based on empirical research, 
that “counterfeits are primarily not seen as substitutes for the authentic prod-
uct.”). See generally Mark A. Lemley & Mark D. McKenna, Irrelevant Confu-
sion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413 (2010) (arguing that trademark law should return 
to a focus on purchasing behavior).  
Congress has found that counterfeiting costs the United States $200 bil-
lion annually, robbing “millions of dollars in tax revenue and tens of thou-
sands of jobs” from the American economy. Stop Counterfeiting in Manufac-
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confusion liability is called for. The remainder of this Article 
will attempt to determine what that justification is, and wheth-
er it is satisfactory. 
II.  VEBLEN BRANDS AND INVISIBLE HANDS   
In terms of the economic policies that underlie so much of 
our thinking about trademark law, there is a logic to the status 
confusion cases, but it is a perverse one. To understand this 
logic, we must ask what it means for a status good to be of high 
quality, as a prelude to understanding how a trademark can 
convey information about that quality to consumers. The eco-
nomic literature on status goods is perhaps not as well-
developed as it is on other topics of interest to trademark 
scholars (such as the literature on advertising),107 but it has a 
long pedigree, dating at least to Thorstein Veblen’s classic 
work, The Theory of the Leisure Class, published in 1899.108 
This literature suggests that the “quality” of status goods is 
fundamentally different from the “quality” of goods with which 
trademark law has traditionally concerned itself. 
A. CONSPICUOUS CONSUMPTION  
As discussed above, the status-confusion cases all rest on 
the premise that purchasers of knockoff luxury goods act with a 
particular purpose: they purchase the knockoffs to display 
 
tured Goods Act, Pub. L. No. 109-181, 120 Stat. 285, 285 (2006). This is, to put 
it mildly, a dubious claim. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-423 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: OBSERVATIONS ON EFFORTS TO QUANTIFY THE 
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COUNTERFEIT AND PIRATED GOODS 13–14 (2010) [here-
inafter ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COUNTERFEIT] (“Most experts we spoke with 
and the literature we reviewed observed that despite significant efforts, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to quantify the net effect of counterfeiting and pira-
cy on the economy as a whole.”); see also David S. Wall & Joanna Large, Jail-
house Frocks: Locating the Public Interest in Policing Counterfeit Luxury Fash-
ion Goods, 50 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1094, 1094–98 (2010); Felix Salmon, All 
Counterfeiting Statistics Are Bullshit, FELIX SALMON (June 9, 2005), http:// 
www.felixsalmon.com/2005/06/all-counterfeiting-statistics-are-bullshit/ (ques-
tioning the accuracy of statistics of counterfeit goods). 
 107. For a recent survey of the voluminous literature on the economics of 
advertising, see Kyle Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of Advertising, in 3 
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1701 (Mark Armstrong & Robert 
H. Porter eds., 2007). 
 108. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (Houghton 
Mifflin Co. 1973) (1899). For a summary and synthesis of Veblen’s predeces-
sors and successors in the economic theory of conspicuous consumption, see 
generally ROGER MASON, THE ECONOMICS OF CONSPICUOUS CONSUMPTION: 
THEORY AND THOUGHT SINCE 1700 (1998). 
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them to others in the hopes that observers will accord them the 
status or prestige that attaches to the genuine luxury good. 
Veblen explored this impulse over a century ago, coining the 
term “conspicuous consumption” to describe it.109 Veblen argued 
that the possession of accumulated material wealth—the tro-
phies of success in various stages of social organization—
confers superior social standing.110 Because relatively high so-
cial standing is something we all want,111 and because relative 
social standing exists only in comparison with others,112 socie-
 
 109. VEBLEN, supra note 108, at 68–101. 
 110. Id. at 29–30 (“[M]an is an agent. He is, in his own apprehension, a 
center of unfolding impulsive activity—‘teleological’ activity. He is an agent 
seeking in every act the accomplishment of some concrete, objective, imper-
sonal end. By force of his being such an agent he is possessed of a taste for ef-
fective work, and a distaste for futile effort. He has a sense of the merit of ser-
viceability or efficiency and of the demerit of futility, waste, or incapacity. This 
aptitude or propensity may be called the instinct of workmanship. Wherever 
the circumstances or traditions of life lead to an habitual comparison of one 
person with another in point of efficiency, the instinct of workmanship works 
out in an emulative or invidious comparison of persons. . . . In any community 
where such an invidious comparison of persons is habitually made, visible suc-
cess becomes an end sought for its own utility as a basis of esteem. Esteem is 
gained and dispraise is avoided by putting one’s efficiency in evidence.”); id. at 
35 (“[I ]t is only when taken in a sense far removed from its naïve meaning 
that consumption of goods can be said to afford the incentive from which ac-
cumulation invariably proceeds. The motive that lies at the root of ownership 
is emulation . . . . The possession of wealth confers honor; it is an invidious 
distinction.”); id. at 36–37 (“[P]ossessions then come to be valued not so much 
as evidence of successful foray, but rather as evidence of the prepotence of the 
possessor of these goods over other individuals within the community. The in-
vidious comparison now becomes primarily a comparison of the owner with the 
other members of the group. . . . [P]roperty now becomes the most easily rec-
ognized evidence of a reputable degree of success . . . . It therefore becomes the 
conventional basis of esteem. Its possession in some amount becomes neces-
sary in order to have any reputable standing in the community. . . . The pos-
session of wealth, which was at the outset valued simply as an evidence of effi-
ciency, becomes, in popular apprehension, itself a meritorious act. Wealth is 
now itself intrinsically honorable and confers honor on its possessor.”). 
 111. See id. at 38 (“Those members of the community who fall short of this, 
somewhat indefinite, normal degree of prowess or of property suffer in the es-
teem of their fellowmen; and consequently they suffer also in their own es-
teem, since the usual basis of self-respect is the respect accorded by one’s 
neighbors. Only individuals with an aberrant temperament can in the long 
run retain their self-esteem in the face of the disesteem of their fellows. . . . In 
any community where goods are held in severalty it is necessary, in order to 
ensure his own peace of mind, that an individual should possess as large a 
portion of goods as others with whom he is accustomed to class himself; and it 
is extremely gratifying to possess something more than others.”). 
 112. Id. at 39 (“[T]he end sought by accumulation is to rank high in com-
parison with the rest of the community in point of pecuniary strength. So long 
as the comparison is distinctly unfavorable to himself, the normal, average in-
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ties lock themselves into a perpetual and ultimately futile 
struggle in which individuals compete to exceed one another in 
wealth: “no general increase of the community’s wealth can 
make any approach to satiating this need, the ground of which 
is the desire of everyone to excel everyone else in the accumula-
tion of goods.”113 
Much of The Theory of the Leisure Class is occupied with 
documenting the various modes of this social competition that 
prevailed in Veblen’s day. While many if not all of these exam-
ples can still be found in American society a century later,114 
perhaps the most generalizable and lasting example has been 
the impulse to engage in the conspicuous consumption of goods. 
Modern economists have developed Veblen’s insight into formal 
models under which the price or scarcity of a good is, in and of 
itself, an element of its utility.115 Under these models, demand 
for a particular good can increase as the price or scarcity of the 
 
dividual will live in chronic dissatisfaction with his present lot; and when he 
has reached what may be called the normal pecuniary standard of the com-
munity, or of his class in the community, this chronic dissatisfaction will give 
place to a restless straining to place a wider and ever-widening pecuniary in-
terval between himself and this average standard. The invidious comparison 
can never become so favorable to the individual making it that he would not 
gladly rate himself still higher relatively to his competitors in the struggle for 
pecuniary reputability.”). 
 113. Id. at 39. 
 114. Compare, e.g., id. at 86–87 (“The low birthrate of the classes upon 
whom the requirements of reputable expenditure fall with great urgency is 
likewise traceable to the exigencies of a standard of living based on conspicu-
ous waste. The conspicuous consumption, and the consequent increased ex-
pense, required in the reputable maintenance of a child is very considerable 
and acts as a powerful deterrent.”), with Tina Fey, Confessions of a Juggler, 
NEW YORKER, Feb. 14 & 21, 2011, at 64, 64 (“All over Manhattan, large fami-
lies have become a status symbol. Four beautiful children named after kings 
and pieces of fruit are a way of saying, ‘I can afford a four-bedroom apartment 
and a hundred and fifty thousand dollars in elementary-school tuition fees 
each year. How you livin’?’”). 
 115. See, e.g., H. Leibenstein, Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the 
Theory of Consumers’ Demand, 64 Q.J. ECON. 183, 199–205 (1950) (“The es-
sential economic characteristic with which we are concerned is the fact that 
the utility derived from a unit of a commodity employed for purposes of con-
spicuous consumption depends not only on the inherent qualities of that unit, 
but also on the price paid for it.”); see also Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Ru-
bin, Counterfeit Goods, 29 J.L. & ECON. 211, 211–26 (1986) (applying 
Leibenstein’s model to the counterfeiting phenomenon); Laurie Simon Bagwell 
& B. Douglas Bernheim, Veblen Effects in a Theory of Conspicuous Consump-
tion, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 349 (1996) (examining factors that cause luxury 
brands to sell at higher prices than budget brands, even when the brands are 
functionally equivalent). For an overview of economists’ efforts to understand 
conspicuous consumption, see generally MASON, supra note 108. 
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good increases, precisely because conspicuously costly or rare 
goods serve as “signals” of social status. In honor of Veblen’s in-
sights, economists refer to such goods as “Veblen goods.”116 
Markets for Veblen goods are peculiar insofar as the social sig-
nal of expense or scarcity itself, rather than the physical good 
in which that signal is manifested, becomes the object of ex-
change.117 
Professor Jeffrey Harrison clearly summarizes these mod-
els in his recent exploration of the relationship of trademark 
law to status goods,118 while Professor Barton Beebe extends 
the analysis to non-hierarchical consumption-based social dif-
ferentiation in his recent discussion of what he describes as the 
“sumptuary turn” in intellectual property law.119 This Article 
will not duplicate their work, but rather seeks to build on it by 
focusing in on narrower questions specifically presented by the 
status-confusion cases. Thus, where Professor Harrison frames 
the ultimate policy question posed by the status-confusion cas-
es as determining whether status signals have the characteris-
tics of a “public good,”120 this Article will explore the definition-
al questions that precede such a determination and the policy 
questions that follow from it. Insofar as they bear directly on 
the relationship between the legal regulation of status-
signaling marks and the legal regulation of expression, these 
questions have significance that Professor Harrison’s economic 
analysis elides completely and Professor Beebe’s sweeping so-
cial critique touches only in passing.121 
Such questions may seem so obvious that they often go un-
asked, but they are essential to understanding the role being 
played by trademark law in the status-confusion cases. The 
first question that must be asked is: what does it mean to “sig-
nal” status? And the second is: why do we resort to consump-
tion to send such a signal?  
 
 116. See generally, e.g., B. Curtis Eaton & Mukesh Eswaran, Well-Being 
and Affluence in the Presence of a Veblen Good, 119 ECON. J. 1088 (2009). 
 117. See generally Shahar Dillbary, Famous Trademarks and the Rational 
Basis for Protecting “Irrational Beliefs,” 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 605 (2007). 
 118. See Harrison, supra note 22, at 204–09. For a related summary of-
fered as background to analysis of status-good manufacturers’ incentives to 
police counterfeiting, see Barnett, supra note 22, at 1386–92. 
 119. See Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, at 816–30. 
 120. See Harrison, supra note 22, at 210–19. Professor Harrison then 
moves on to examine whether there might be a moral rights argument for us-
ing trademark law to prevent unauthorized copying of status signals, see id. at 
220–26, an argument I take up below. See infra Part III.C.1. 
 121. See Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, at 821, 883–84. 
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B. SIGNALS AND THE LEMONS PROBLEM 
Veblen posited that the key to relative social status is not 
just acquiring wealth; it is being known by others as having 
relatively high wealth.122 Wealth is of little social use unless it 
can be signaled to others: the fact that one has a large amount 
of wealth must in some way be communicated to and under-
stood by one’s social audience.123 It is logical to ask, then, why 
those who desire high status don’t use more direct and conven-
ient modes of information transfer and simply tell their social 
relations that they’re wealthy. They might make a habit of in-
troducing themselves by name, annual income, and net worth; 
or by printing the same information on business cards; or silk-
screening it onto articles of clothing; or by publishing it in a 
newspaper; or distributing it on flyers. In other words, they 
could engage in explicit speech to acquire the social status that 
attaches to wealth, and at a far lower cost than through con-
spicuous consumption of expensive or rare goods. This raises 
the question: why is overt speech not the universal tool for sig-
naling, and thereby acquiring, social status? 
Part of the reason may be that social norms suppress such 
expression.124 Normative social commitments (e.g., democratic 
solidarity, egalitarianism, populism) may discourage expres-
sions of wealth-based difference.125 The undesirable conse-
quences of rivalry and envy may deter calling attention to ine-
quality in any direct way.126 Perhaps for these reasons, it has 
long been considered bad manners, or worse, bad citizenship to 
talk about or otherwise overtly draw attention to one’s 
wealth,127 though these mores may be changing.128 Still, there is 
 
 122. VEBLEN, supra note 108, at 42. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See, e.g., Bagwell & Bernheim, supra note 115, at 367 (“Obviously 
there are other important considerations that influence the choice of a signal; 
completely transparent exhibitions of wealth seem socially unacceptable.”). 
 125. See id. 
 126. See, e.g., David Card et al., Inequality at Work: The Effect of Peer Sal-
aries on Job Satisfaction, 102 AM. ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at 
http://emlab.berkeley.edu/~moretti/ucpay.pdf (reporting an study finding that 
knowledge that one’s income is less than average inflicts psychological harm, 
while knowledge that one’s income is above average does not provide a psycho-
logical benefit). 
 127. EMILY POST, ETIQUETTE: IN SOCIETY, IN BUSINESS, IN POLITICS AND 
AT HOME 506 (9th ed. 1923) (“A very well-bred man intensely dislikes the 
mention of money, and never speaks of it (out of business hours) if he can 
avoid it.”); Daniel Gross, Skip the Yacht Race, SLATE (June 22, 2010), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2257823/ (proposing the first of three rules governing 
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a more compelling argument for the prevalence of consumption 
over speech as a means of signaling wealth-based status. More-
over, this argument shares strong affinities with the economic 
model that justifies trademark law. 
The primary barrier to using speech as a signal of wealth-
based status is likely the fact that anyone can say he is 
wealthy. Speech is essentially costless. And if Veblen is correct 
that the desire for wealth-based status is universal and un-
quenchable, we should expect people to make overt claims of 
wealth constantly, even if they lack significant wealth. Howev-
er, it is likely to be very difficult (that is, costly) for the hearers 
of explicit claims of wealth to determine whether such claims 
are true, even if they were motivated enough to try. Because 
explicitly claiming to have superior wealth is easy and costless 
despite high demand, but verifying such claims is costly, a 
claim of wealth cannot be credibly made through ordinary ver-
bal expression. Inevitably, using speech to signal social status 
causes a kind of market failure.129  
This type of market failure should be familiar to trademark 
scholars: it is known in the economics literature as a “lemons 
problem.” In his classic paper,130 Professor George Akerlof ex-
plained that in markets where information about products is 
asymmetrical—that is, where sellers know more about product 
quality than buyers can reasonably be expected to find out—the 
fear of being cheated causes buyers to demand risk discounts, 
potentially below prices that sellers of quality goods are willing 
to accept.131 Akerlof illustrated the point with a discussion of 
the used-car market. He reasoned that the risk discounts de-
manded by buyers would ultimately drive sellers of quality cars 
out of the market, which would become flooded with “lemons,” 
the only cars sellers are willing to sell at the price buyers are 
willing to pay.132 The spiraling decline in product quality in 
 
CEOs’ conspicuous consumption: “Avoid any activity generally linked with Eu-
ropean aristocracy”). 
 128. See Alex Williams, Not-So-Personal Finance, N.Y. TIMES (SUNDAY 
STYLES) Apr. 27, 2008, at 1. 
 129. Cf. Barnett, supra note 22, at 1388–90 (noting the “negative consump-
tion externalit[ies]” due to “additional perceived users outside the elite con-
sumer class”); Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, at 826–28 (noting the 
“congestion externalities” that frustrate the cultivation of consumption-based 
social distinction). 
 130. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons:” Quality Uncertainty 
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489–92 (1970). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
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turn would ultimately drive buyers out of the market, with the 
result that no goods can trade.133 The lemons problem is a par-
ticular form of market failure that can be avoided by mitigating 
the information asymmetry that causes it. One of the ways of 
doing so is by using a trademark in iterated commercial en-
counters to serve as indicia of a reputation for quality.134 By re-
liably exposing producers to future losses if they attempt to de-
ceive buyers regarding product quality, trademarks can 
prevent the lemons problem and encourage the production of 
high-quality goods. 
Returning to the “conspicuous consumption” phenomenon, 
we can see how the logic of Akerlof ’s argument applies to the 
market failure that would result from using speech to signal 
status. In the “market” for social status, the information 
asymmetry at issue is not between sellers and buyers of goods, 
but between claimants of social status and the social audience 
that decides whether to confer such status. Where such status 
is hierarchically determined by relative wealth, for example, 
the claimant plays the role of seller, as he generally has superi-
or information to his audience as to whether he has the quali-
ties—in this case, wealth—he claims. Because speech is cost-
less but status is valuable, a false assertion of wealth leaves a 
speaker no worse off—even if he is not believed—and, poten-
tially, much better off—if he is.135 However, because the audi-
ence (playing the role of buyer) is aware of the speaker’s incen-
tives and cannot easily verify his claims of superior wealth, the 
proliferation of false claims of wealth would cause all claims of 
wealth to be disbelieved, even if they were true.136 Just as the 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. See id. at 499–500 (explaining that brand names can “counteract[ ] the 
effects of quality uncertainty”). 
 135. This assertion assumes that there is no social sanction—e.g., excom-
munication from one’s social group—for such false declarations. Of course, this 
assumption may not be sound in all cases, particularly in small communities 
or social groups, but on the social scale at which trademark-related conspicu-
ous consumption generally operates, it is likely to be a good approximation. 
E.g., Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, at 884 (“This is most apparent in 
the global trademark system, populated as it is by globally famous 
‘hypermarks’ that are not so much designations of source as commodified sim-
ulations of such designations, simulations that are themselves the focus of 
consumption rather than the underlying product, if any, to which they are af-
fixed.”). 
 136. The question whether this argument applies with equal force to non-
hierarchical forms of social distinction, such as those explored in Beebe, 
Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, is beyond the scope of this Article. This limi-
tation is of little relevance precisely because the status-confusion cases are 
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owner of a high-quality used car cannot get a fair price due to 
the proliferation of lemons in the used car market,137 the truly 
wealthy individual cannot acquire high social status merely by 
verbally asserting his wealth. In sum, verbal signaling of 
wealth-based social status is suppressed—in the absence of le-
gal intervention—by social and economic forces. 
C. LEMONS IN THE MARKET FOR SOCIAL STATUS 
In order to prevent this market failure and circumvent the 
suppression of status signals by social and economic forces, at-
tempts to claim wealth-based status must somehow be made 
costly to the claimant, just as putting one’s reputation and fu-
ture business on the line is supposed to make the sale of poor-
quality goods costly to a trademark owner. Veblen argued that 
society’s solution to this problem was conspicuous material 
waste. “In order to gain and to hold the esteem of men,” he pos-
ited, “it is not sufficient merely to possess wealth or power. The 
wealth or power must be put in evidence, for esteem is awarded 
only on evidence.”138 To this end, Veblen observed what he 
termed the “leisure class” engaging in conspicuous consumption 
of naturally scarce and therefore costly goods: hand-made silver 
spoons instead of machine-made aluminum ones;139 precious 
metals and gems;140 expensive “food, drink, [and] narcotics;”141 
fashionable dress.142 “Since the consumption of these more excel-
lent goods is an evidence of wealth,” Veblen wrote, “it becomes 
honorific; and conversely, the failure to consume in due quantity 
and quality becomes a mark of inferiority and demerit.” 143  
 
almost by definition concerned with high-priced, luxury products. Neverthe-
less, to the extent that social distinction along dimensions other than wealth—
even non-hierarchical dimensions—is too scarce to satisfy the demand for it, 
the same dynamic might be expected wherever a seeker of status might at-
tempt to stake a claim through non-scarce speech, and may be reflected in 
trademark law. The merchandising cases are one area where such a dynamic 
may be in evidence, though there are certainly alternative explanations for 
their outcomes. See, e.g., Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An 
Analysis of the Merchandising of Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. REV. 603 
(1984) (analyzing policy justifications for merchandising protections); Dogan & 
Lemley, supra note 48 (same). 
 137. See Akerlof, supra note 130, at 489–92.  
 138. VEBLEN, supra note 108, at 42. 
 139. Id. at 94–95. 
 140. Id. at 96. 
 141. Id. at 61–64. 
 142. Id. at 118–31. 
 143. Id. at 64; see also Bagwell & Bernheim, supra note 115, at 366–67 
(noting the “money-burning” or “dissipative” nature of signaling through con-
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American judges interpreting the Lanham Act in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have taken Veblen’s 
insight a step further. As discussed above, courts in status-
confusion cases claim that the same status-seeking behavior 
Veblen documented with respect to naturally rare and there-
fore costly goods can extend to goods that are artificially scarce 
due to the marketing strategies of a trademark owner. In short, 
the common-law evolution of trademark infringement has re-
placed Veblen goods with “Veblen brands.” Economists have 
noted this shift: 
Traditionally, the purpose of brand names has been to assure quality. 
The buyer of a branded good could rely on the reputation of the manu-
facturer to guarantee the quality of the good. . . . More recently, 
trademarks seem to have taken on an additional function. Many per-
sons purchase branded goods for the purpose of demonstrating to oth-
ers that they are consumers of the particular good.144 
In the legal academic literature, Professor Shahar Dillbary has 
brought this economic observation full circle, arguing that one 
of the “products” being sold with a branded good is precisely the 
social signal the brand conveys, separate and apart from the 
good’s physical qualities.145 And again, Professor Beebe extends 
the argument to non-hierarchical forms of social distinction, 
arguing that the logical end result of conspicuous consumption 
in the modern age of easy copying and rapid innovation is an 
entropic slide into indistinction.146 
This substitution of brands for goods explains courts’ con-
cern in the status-confusion cases over the defendants’ custom-
ers who “achiev[e] the status of owning the genuine article at a 
knockoff price”147—and indeed, their concern with price in gen-
eral. Breaking the link between a Veblen brand and the price 
paid for it threatens its credibility as a signal of wealth. While 
 
spicuous consumption); Jeremy N. Sheff, Biasing Brands, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1245, 1282 (2011). On the notion of money-burning signaling in general, see 
Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring 
Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 629–33 (1981); Phillip Nelson, 
Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL. ECON. 729, 731–34 (1974). See generally 
Richard E. Kihlstrom & Michael H. Riordan, Advertising as a Signal, 92 J. 
POL. ECON. 427 (1984) (developing a mathematical model to describe the qual-
ity-signaling function of advertising); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Price and 
Advertising Signals of Product Quality, 94 J. POL. ECON. 796 (1986) (same, for 
both prices and advertising levels). 
 144. Higgins & Rubin, supra note 115, at 211 (emphasis added). 
 145. See Dillbary, supra note 117, at 620–28. 
 146. See Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, at 882–84. 
 147. Hermès Int’l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 109 (2d 
Cir. 2000). 
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the judges in these cases sometimes refer to product “quali-
ty,”148 it is clear that the products’ physical qualities or work-
manship are not at issue, or there would be no need to resort to 
status-confusion theories rather than bystander-confusion or 
downstream-confusion theories (or even traditional point-of-
sale confusion theories). Rather, the “quality” sought by con-
sumers in the market for status goods is the quality of the mes-
sage the brand conveys: its ability to communicate social status 
to others. 
Thus, the information asymmetry that trademarks are 
called on to mitigate in the status-confusion cases is not be-
tween buyers and sellers of goods bearing Veblen brands—
genuine or counterfeit. Rather, the asymmetry is between pur-
chasers of goods bearing Veblen brands—genuine or counter-
feit—and their social audience. The information as to which the 
asymmetry exists is not ultimately about the product at all, but 
about the social status of the person consuming it. And conse-
quently, the failure that this line of cases guards against is not 
in the market for any particular class of goods, but in the mar-
ket for social status. Put simply, the “lemons” in the status-
confusion cases are not used cars, and they are not really even 
clocks or handbags or watches; they are people. 
While the metaphor of the lemons problem provides a use-
ful tool for understanding the policy underlying the status-
confusion cases, it raises problems of its own. Specifically, it re-
veals the underlying nature of conspicuous consumption—of 
status signaling in general—as not only social, but expressive 
as well. It is precisely the desire to communicate information 
about oneself to others that generates the impulse for conspicu-
ous consumption, and it is the asymmetry of information be-
tween speaker and audience that prevents this communication 
from taking a form we would more easily recognize as speech. 
The primary effect of legal enforcement of Veblen brands is 
thus to divert the impulse for social expression out of the arena 
of costless speech and into a market system. Because the mar-
ket would fail without a mechanism for rationing status sig-
nals, such signals must be rendered scarce somehow. Absent 
natural scarcity, legal intervention would appear to be the only 
alternative. The courts in status-confusion cases have seized on 
this alternative, creating legally enforceable rights to exclude 
others from status signals—propertizing them. Trademark 
 
 148. See, e.g., id. at 108 (quoting United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 
1347, 1353 n.6 (11th Cir. 1987)). 
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law—which has propertized symbols for centuries in the service 
of commerce—may appear to be a convenient legal instrument 
for this purpose. However, because the social signaling function 
of Veblen brands pertains not to the commercial relationships 
among buyers and sellers that we traditionally look to trade-
mark law to regulate, but rather to social relationships among 
members of a community, the status-confusion cases raise is-
sues of policy and even of constitutionality that are not impli-
cated by any other area of trademark law. 
III. THE MARKET FOR SOCIAL EXPRESSION 
Signaling status is an expressive act, which means that 
courts’ extension of trademark infringement liability under the 
Lanham Act to status-confusion may implicate the First 
Amendment. But the mere fact that conspicuous consumption 
is expressive in nature does not necessarily imply a specific 
conclusion with regard to the constitutionality of this area of 
trademark law. Rather, it poses a set of questions about the 
appropriate role of government in regulating Veblen brands. A 
consumer is “saying” something by wearing a Rolex watch or an 
Hermès handbag on her arm, just as a high-school student in 
Des Moines is saying something by wearing a black band on his 
arm during the Vietnam War149 (and, for that matter, just as a 
pharmacist is saying something by posting a price list in his 
shop window).150 Obviously this does not imply that all these 
forms of expression are, or should be, treated equally under the 
First Amendment. Nevertheless, First Amendment analysis is 
a useful lens for examining the policy implications of status-
confusion doctrine, largely because it demands that justifica-
tions for the doctrine be identified and balanced against com-
peting concerns.151 This Part argues that status-confusion doc-
 
 149. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cnty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 503 
(1969). 
 150. See Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 748 (1976). 
 151. A complete doctrinal analysis of the appropriate categorization of the-
se cases for purposes of determining the appropriate level of First Amendment 
scrutiny is beyond the scope of this Article. Readers in search of such a thor-
ough analysis of trademark law generally may wish to refer to Lisa P. Ramsey, 
Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU L. REV. 381 
(2008), and Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunc-
tions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 185–86, 216–24 (1998). 
To these analyses, which generally conclude that the effect of trademark law 
on expression is not content-neutral, I would merely add that, to the extent 
that status-confusion doctrine as a whole purports to limit claims of social sta-
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trine runs afoul of the First Amendment, but I recognize that 
this constitutional analysis is likely to be controversial. Even if 
the reader disagrees with my ultimate conclusion, this Part’s 
analysis should suffice to demonstrate that the policy interests 
underlying the First Amendment—interests in democratic egal-
itarianism, in the truth-forcing power of uninhibited debate, in 
the dignitary value of uninhibited self-expression and self-
definition, and in protecting disfavored or controversial politi-
cal and social points of view from government suppression—are 
at stake in status-confusion cases; and that these interests are 
not being sufficiently considered by the courts deciding such 
cases. 
A. THRESHOLD FIRST AMENDMENT QUESTIONS 
Before proceeding to the ultimate question whether status- 
confusion doctrine withstands First Amendment scrutiny, there 
are a number of formal hurdles the matter must clear. Failure 
to clear these doctrinal hurdles might lead to the conclusion 
that the First Amendment does not even apply to the conduct 
at issue in status-confusion cases. This Section considers those 
threshold issues, and argues that the First Amendment is in-
deed applicable.  
1. State Action 
As a preliminary matter, we must ask whether the con-
spicuous consumption of Veblen brands is the type of conduct 
that even comes under the First Amendment’s protections. The 
first barrier to such protection is the state-action require-
ment—the rule that the First Amendment restrains the actions 
of the government only, not those of private parties.152 This is, 
in essence, the objection that the Court raised and rejected in 
 
tus to those who make such claims by virtue of relatively superior wealth, the 
doctrine is likely not viewpoint-neutral either. Cf. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 
505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (“[The government] has no such authority to license 
one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Mar-
quis of Queensberry rules.”); infra Part III.B. 
 152. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) (“It is, of course, a com-
monplace that the constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only 
against abridgment by government, federal or state. Thus, while statutory or 
common law may in some situations extend protection or provide redress 
against a private corporation or person who seeks to abridge the free expres-
sion of others, no such protection or redress is provided by the Constitution 
itself.” (internal citation omitted)). 
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New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.153 Although some lower courts 
have found to the contrary,154 commentators largely conclude—
in accord with Sullivan—that the enforcement of a judgment in 
a trademark action in such a way as to burden expression 
would satisfy the state-action requirement.155 This Article will 
not dwell on the issue, which has been thoroughly discussed by 
those commentators. Assuming the status-confusion cases in-
volve state action, the question remains: does the imposition of 
liability in these cases burden expression? 
2. Symbolic Expression/Expressive Conduct 
Starting with the expressive content of the consumption of 
Veblen brands, the Court’s opinion in Texas v. Johnson pro-
vides the relevant test: 
In deciding whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communi-
cative elements to bring the First Amendment into play, we have 
asked whether ‘[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was 
present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message 
would be understood by those who viewed it.’156 
Based on the nuanced views of social scientists, it is unclear 
that conspicuous consumption of Veblen brands passes this 
test. From the social critic’s perspective, “the primary objection 
to the view that consumption choices are a form of language is 
that it improperly assumes ‘the existence of a shared system of 
symbols.’”157 Similarly, economists appear to have concluded 
 
 153. 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (“Although this is a civil lawsuit between pri-
vate parties, the Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law which peti-
tioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of 
speech and press. It matters not that that law has been applied in a civil ac-
tion. . . . The test is not the form in which state power has been applied but, 
whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised.”). 
 154. Reddy Commc’ns, Inc. v. Envtl. Action Found., 199 U.S.P.Q. 630, 633–
34 (D.D.C. 1977); Interbank Card Ass’n v. Simms, 431 F. Supp. 131, 133–34 
(M.D.N.C. 1977); Empire Home Servs., L.L.C. v. Empire Iron Works, Inc., No. 
05-CV-72584, 2007 WL 1218717, at *8 (E.D. Mich. 2007 April 23, 2007). 
 155. See Denicola, supra note 51, at 190 & n.146; Lemley & Volokh, supra 
note 151, at 185–86, 216–24; Ramsey, supra note 151, at 407–09. 
 156. 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 
410–11 (1974)). 
 157. Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, at 883 (quoting Colin Camp-
bell, When the Meaning Is Not a Message: A Critique of the Consumption as 
Communication Thesis, in BUY THIS BOOK: STUDIES IN ADVERTISING AND 
CONSUMPTION 340, 341 (Mica Nava et al. eds., 1997)). But see Beebe, Semiotic 
Analysis, supra note 46, at 703 (“It has long been a cliché, of social theory as 
much as of advertising practice, that consumers communicate with each other 
by the objects they consume. Of late, however, commodity culture has begun to 
unburden itself of the object language of material commodities. The trademark 
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that different brands send different social signals depending on 
the sender and recipient, the consumer and his or her social ob-
server.158 
Such ambiguity and nuance are not recognized, however, 
by the courts that decide the status-confusion cases, who uni-
versally assert that the consumption of both genuine and coun-
terfeit branded goods is intended to and in fact does convey a 
particular message of social status.159 Indeed, this proposition is 
a necessary step in establishing infringement in the status-
confusion cases. Absent the receipt of a supposedly false social 
message by post-sale observers, the injury on which liability 
depends simply evaporates—there is no other “confusion” pre-
sented by the facts.160 As such, the status-confusion cases them-
selves conclude—or at least assume—that the conspicuous con-
sumption of Veblen brands has “sufficient communicative 
elements” to bring the First Amendment into play. 
Granted, the status-confusion courts’ reasoning on this 
score is almost embarrassingly unsophisticated. The social sci-
ence literature described above suggests that rather than being 
strictly a means to efficiently and effectively assert wealth-
based hierarchical social status, conspicuous consumption of 
branded goods is part of a subtle and complex process of social 
definition, affiliation, and differentiation along countless di-
mensions.161 Were the status-confusion courts to take such 
 
system has developed as an alternative language of consumption, and its de-
velopment has been rapid indeed. No other language in history, and certainly 
no other language of distinction, has experienced such explosive growth, both 
extensively and intensively, in so short a time. The trademark system’s classi-
ficatory scheme now orders culture as much as the market. To be sure, it is not 
the only such system to do so, but none exercises its classifying function so ex-
oterically, in terms so easily and widely understood.”). 
 158. See Berger & Ward, supra note 65, at 565–66; Han et al., supra note 
65, at 28–32. 
 159. See, e.g., Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-
Le Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955) (“[S]ome customers 
would buy plaintiff ’s cheaper clock for the purpose of acquiring the prestige 
gained by displaying what many visitors at the customers’ homes would re-
gard as a prestigious article.”); see also supra Part I.C. 
 160. See, e.g., supra note 104. 
 161. See Berger & Ward, supra note 66, at 565–66; Jennifer Edson Escalas 
& James R. Bettman, You Are What They Eat: The Influence of Reference 
Groups on Consumers’ Connections to Brands, 13 J. CONSUMER PSYCH. 339, 
339 (2003), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/S15327663JCP1303_14 
(“When brand associations are used to construct the self or to communicate 
the self-concept to others, a connection is formed with the 
brand. . . . [A]ssociations about reference groups become associated with 
brands those groups are perceived to use, and vice versa. The set of associa-
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complex social phenomena into account, it is possible that coun-
tervailing interests in expressive association162 might be as 
strongly implicated as the interests in expression discussed in 
this paper, and that Veblen’s model would lose much of its ap-
peal.163 Professor Beebe has provided a thorough exploration of 
the role of intellectual property law in the construction, perpet-
uation, and dissolution of these non-hierarchical forms of social 
distinction,164 and his analysis is likely more accurate than that 
of the courts deciding status-confusion cases in its description 
of conspicuous consumption. Nevertheless, status-confusion 
doctrine rests on a set of assumed facts about the nature of 
consumption, and so long as courts continue to rely on those as-
sumptions in applying trademark liability, it is only proper that 
the same facts be subjected to First Amendment analysis. 
3. Standing 
The fact that consumption of Veblen brands is expressive 
does not necessarily mean that regulation of commerce in Veb-
len brands similarly warrants First Amendment scrutiny. This 
 
tions can then be linked to consumers’ mental representations of self as they 
select brands with meanings congruent with an aspect of their current self-
concept or possible self, thus forging a connection between the consumer and 
the brand.”); Han, supra note 65, at 28–32. 
 162. 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, § 31:145 (“A trademark is itself a power-
ful symbol identifying a single person, corporation or commercial source. When 
it is used without permission as a vehicle for someone else’s controversial mes-
sage, it will be a matter of fact whether the ordinary viewer is likely to believe 
that the owner of the trademark sponsors or approves of the content of the 
message. Alternatively, the message itself may be so ‘morally repugnant’ that 
the person or company would be forced to speak in rebuttal. When the proper-
ty right resides in the symbol of a trademark itself, the link between defend-
ant’s message and the trademark owner should be much more likely to occur 
than when the property right merely resides in a semi-public shopping center, 
as in Pruneyard.” (citing Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 
(1980)). Cf., e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (holding 
that requiring the Boy Scouts to admit a gay scoutmaster under a state anti-
discrimination law violated the organization’s First Amendment right of ex-
pressive association); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of 
Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 572–73 (1995) (holding St. Patrick’s Day Parade 
organizers have a First Amendment right to exclude a gay, lesbian, and bisex-
ual Irish-American organization from their event). 
 163. Possible, but in my view, unlikely. See generally Jeremy N. Sheff, 
Brand Renegades, 1 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. (forthcoming 2012), 
available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1919328 (arguing that extant 
trademark doctrine supports the proposition that the consumption of socially 
charged brands is protected expression more than it supports an association-
based right of brand owners to suppress such consumption). 
 164. See generally Beebe, Semiotic Analysis, supra note 46. 
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distinction can be understood as a standing argument regard-
ing First Amendment scrutiny of status-confusion claims. The 
defendant in status-confusion cases is selling others the means 
to express a message of social status but is not expressing such 
a message himself. Allowing such a defendant to raise a First 
Amendment defense based on injuries to the defendant’s cus-
tomers might therefore seem to run afoul of the general rule 
against third-party standing.165 But of course, this rule has ex-
ceptions which are likely applicable to the trademark context 
generally and the status-confusion context in particular. 
Trademark infringement and unfair competition law allow pro-
ducers to assert the interests of their customers in court,166 an 
example of the principle that a sufficient relationship between 
the party asserting the right and the party whose right is being 
asserted can create an exception to the “rule of self-restraint”167 
against third-party standing.168 
Moreover, granting standing to a status-confusion plaintiff 
but not to a defendant in the same case would create a double-
standard. In traditional point-of-sale confusion cases, of course, 
such discrimination might be legitimate. The point-of-sale con-
 
 165. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (“[T]he plaintiff 
generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his 
claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”). It is notable 
that at least one important jurisdiction is considering legislation to criminalize 
the purchase of counterfeit trademarked goods, rather than their sale. New 
York City Council File No. Int. 0544-2011 (Apr. 28, 2011), available at http:// 
legistar.council.nyc.gov (click “Legislation;” then search “2011” for “Int 0544-
2011;” then follow “Int 0544-2011” hyperlink). Presumably the standing anal-
ysis regarding such a statute would be more straightforward. 
 166. Thus, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act gives producers the right to sue 
their competitors in order to vindicate their customers’ interests, although this 
exception to the rule against vicarious standing has been criticized in the false 
advertising context. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006) (giving a private right of 
action to “any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged” 
by acts that are likely to cause confusion of consumers or that misrepresent 
the qualities of goods). See generally Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for 
False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law 
of Deception, 78 VA. L. REV. 1 (1992) (criticizing the recognition of competitor 
standing in false advertising cases). 
 167. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255–58 (1953) (“There is such a 
close relationship between the restrictive covenant here and the sanction of a 
state court which would punish respondent for not going forward with her cov-
enant . . . that relaxation of the rule is called for here.”). 
 168. Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 
289 n.71 (1984) (“The Court appears quite willing to permit such [third-party 
constitutional] challenges simply upon a showing of the existence of certain 
relationships between the litigant and the third party right holder, such as 
those between vendor and customer, or physician and patient.”). 
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fusion plaintiff can assert his own injury in the form of diver-
sion of trade, whereas the defendant who is alleged to have de-
ceived his own customers would seem to be a poor representa-
tive of his victims’ interests. In contrast, trademark owners in 
status-confusion cases are unlikely to be able to establish any 
lost sales, and the customers of defendants in those cases have 
gotten exactly what they wanted.169 In short, it seems appropri-
ate to permit status-confusion defendants to raise the First 
Amendment interests of their customers in litigation.170 
4. False Statements of Fact 
One last possible objection to applying the First Amend-
ment to status-confusion cases is that whatever expression is 
burdened by the threat of infringement liability constitutes a 
socially valueless false statement of fact. This objection raises 
three questions: first, what is the “fact” that conspicuous con-
sumption purports to communicate; second, even if such a “fact” 
were false, would the First Amendment not extend it protec-
tion; and third, does the answer to the second question depend 
at all on the possibility that even a false statement of fact 
might have social value? 
On the first point, even given the status-confusion courts’ 
less-than-nuanced understanding of conspicuous consump-
tion,171 we might infer a range of expressive content from the 
act of consuming a counterfeit luxury good. Depending on the 
level of generality at which the message is thought to be 
pitched, the conspicuous consumer of such a product might be 
saying, “I purchased this genuine luxury product from the own-
er of the trademark affixed to it (or an authorized reseller),” or 
“I spent so many dollars on this product,” or “I am the kind of 
person who has so many dollars to spend on this kind of prod-
uct,” or “I am the kind of person who consumes this kind of 
product,” or “I am as good a person as (or a better person than) 
you.” Importantly, in the status-confusion cases, only the first 
two—the most specific—of these statements can be categorical-
ly deemed false,172 while the language of those cases implies 
 
 169. See supra note 106. 
 170. See Michael Grynberg, Trademark Litigation as Consumer Conflict, 83 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 60, 89–90 (2008). 
 171. See supra notes 159–60 and accompanying text. 
 172. Indeed, recent research suggests that purchasers of counterfeit luxury 
goods can afford genuine articles but prefer, for various reasons, to purchase 
counterfeits (at least initially). DAVENPORT LYONS, COUNTERFEITING LUXURY: 
EXPOSING THE MYTHS (June 2007) ( finding that purchasers of counterfeit lux-
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that the last statement—which seems more like a statement of 
opinion than of fact173—is most in line with what purchasers of 
counterfeit goods are actually trying to express.174  
On the second point, even these narrowly construed and 
therefore literally false statements may not fall outside the pro-
tection of the First Amendment. While a mountain of Supreme 
Court dicta asserts that false statements of fact have no social 
or constitutional value,175 First Amendment scholars consider 
 
ury goods are of a similar demographic profile as purchasers of genuine luxury 
goods, and in fact are more likely to purchase a genuine luxury good than is 
their demographic group as a whole). 
 173. Cf. Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John’s Int’l, Inc. 227 F.3d 489, 497 (5th Cir. 
2000) (“[N]on-actionable ‘puffery’ comes in at least two possible forms: (1) an 
exaggerated, blustering, and boasting statement upon which no reasonable 
buyer would be justified in relying; or (2) a general claim of superiority over 
comparable products that is so vague that it can be understood as nothing 
more than a mere expression of opinion.”). This point also provides an answer 
to the argument that misrepresentation of social status could cause a tangible 
injury, for example, if a confidence man wore counterfeit luxury goods to en-
gender trust in his victims. I would argue that such a use of a counterfeit 
product, while it might be considered expressive, would not be properly con-
sidered a false statement of fact. To the contrary, the confidence man hypo-
thetical seems more analogous to the Pizza Hut court’s first definition of puff-
ery, insofar as reliance on luxury consumption as an indicator of 
trustworthiness in business transactions could be said to be an unreasonable 
basis to enter into such transactions. I am grateful to Professor Rebecca 
Tushnet for this point. See Rebecca Tushnet, WIPIP at BU Session 3, REBECCA 
TUSHNET’S 43(B)LOG (Feb. 12, 2011, 10:07 AM), http://tushnet.blogspot.com/ 
2011/02/wipip-at-bu-session-3.html. 
Of course, the doctrine of puffery in itself reflects a judgment that an au-
dience ought to be held to a standard of reasonableness, and that they rightly 
bear the risk of any loss they suffer by acting in unreasonable reliance on a 
statement that is properly characterized as puffery. Whether such an objective 
standard of the consumer ought to be incorporated into trademark law, let 
alone into post-sale confusion law, is an open question. See Rebecca Tushnet, 
Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and False Advertising 
Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305, 1352–73 (2011). See generally Barton Beebe, 
Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2020 (2005) 
(analyzing “trademark law[’s] lack [of ] a well-developed theory of the consum-
er”); Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Model of Trademark 
Law, 98 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012). 
 174. See supra Part I.C. In fact, current research suggests that many 
knockoff purchasers are expressing a kind of aspirational social claim: they 
freely admit to owning a counterfeit product, and perceive it as a way to plan 
and test their future social status and consumption behaviors. DAVENPORT 
LYONS, supra note 172, at 15 (“We found that fake owners were proud of their 
purchases, especially as the quality of fakes is now perceived as on a par with 
that of the genuine products.”); see also Gosline, supra note 106. 
 175. See United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1218–19 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(Bybee, J., dissenting) (collecting cases), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3098 (Oct. 
17, 2011). 
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the constitutional status of false statements of fact a vexed 
question.176 Of course, regulation of false statements of fact that 
cause monetary or reputational harms—defamation and fraud 
being the most obvious examples—has long been considered 
constitutional.177 It is for this very reason that traditional appli-
cations of trademark law—which proscribe certain misleading 
forms of commercial expression in order to prevent injury to 
mark owners’ goodwill and fraud against confused purchas-
ers—raise no First Amendment issues.178 But absent such di-
rect injury flowing from the false statement, other concerns—
about chilling effects on protected expression,179 fear of a slip-
pery slope to overbearing government regulation of expres-
sion,180 or distrust of government in the regulation of “ideologi-
cally inflected” statements181—might well lead one to conclude 
that the First Amendment has a role to play in keeping the 
government out of the role of speech referee.182 Indeed, these 
concerns have generated heated judicial and scholarly debate 
over the applicability of the First Amendment in another area 
 
 176. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, The First Amendment and the Dissemination 
of Socially Worthless Untruths, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 2–6 (2008); Frederick 
Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897, 912–19 
(2010); Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment: A Central, 
Complex, and Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1107–
10 (2006); Mark Tushnet, “Telling Me Lies:” The Constitutionality of Regulat-
ing False Statements of Fact 7–16, 24–25 (Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working 
Paper Series, Paper No. 11-02, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1737930 [hereinafter Tushnet, False Statements of Fact].  
 177. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 
557, 563–64 (1980) (“[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the suppres-
sion of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about 
lawful activity. The government may ban forms of communication more likely 
to deceive the public than to inform it, or commercial speech related to illegal 
activity.”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 301–02 (1964) (Goldberg, 
J., concurring) (“The imposition of liability for private defamation does not 
abridge the freedom of public speech or any other freedom protected by the 
First Amendment.”); see also Tushnet, False Statements of Fact, supra note 
176, at 2 n.5, 14. 
 178. See Ramsey, supra note 151, at 414–21. 
 179. See Tushnet, False Statements of Fact, supra note 176, at 7–10 (citing 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279). 
 180. See id. at 16–17. 
 181. See id. at 17–22. 
 182. Cf. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring) (“The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authori-
ty from assuming a guardianship of the public mind through regulating the 
press, speech, and religion. In this field every person must be his own watch-
man for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any government to sepa-
rate the true from the false for us.”). 
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where the government purports to regulate claims of status: 
prosecutions under the Stolen Valor Act.183 Given the far nar-
rower focus of that statute, these concerns would seem to apply 
with far greater force to the “ideologically inflected”184 use of 
Veblen brands to claim social status in a diverse and socially 
mobile society. 
This brings us to the third question (two related questions, 
really): what is the social value of whatever expressive content 
inheres in conspicuous consumption of counterfeit Veblen 
brands, and does application of the First Amendment depend 
on our assessment of that value? Why might we allow a con-
sumer to attempt to deceive her social audience as to her con-
sumption practices? The status-confusion cases suggest that 
the harm resulting from such deception is that an observer 
might accord wealth-based social status to the purchaser of a 
counterfeit luxury product, or withhold it from the purchaser of 
a genuine one.185 It is unclear whether this mistaken grant of 
status can be understood as a legally cognizable injury on a par 
with the injuries worked by fraud and defamation.186 More im-
portantly, even if we were to consider it an injury, we could do 
so only from the perspective of one segment of society; to an-
other segment of society, it is a benefit. The deception worked 
by status-confusion allows for the possibility that hierarchical 
social status—and all that flows from it—might be allocated 
based on something other than wealth. This may be bad for the 
wealthy, but potentially quite good for everyone else—a very 
 
 183. Compare id. with Eugene Volokh, Amicus Curiae Brief: Boundaries of 
the First Amendment’s “False Statements of Fact” Exception, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & 
C.L. 343 (2010) (finding that, although the exception to First Amendment pro-
tection of false statements can be ambiguous, it can still be constitutionally 
permissible). The Stolen Valor Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-437, 120 Stat. 3266 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006)), makes it a federal crime to falsely claim 
to have been awarded certain military decorations. As of this writing, the 
statute has been ruled unconstitutional by the Ninth Circuit (over strenuous 
dissents) and by the District of Colorado, but upheld by the Western District of 
Virginia; the Supreme Court will hear a challenge to the statute’s constitu-
tionality this term. See United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 
2010), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 638 F.3d 666, cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 
3098 (Oct. 17, 2011); United States v. Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d 815 (W.D. Va. 
2011); United States v. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (D. Colo. 2010). 
 184. See Tushnet, False Statements of Fact, supra note 176, at 17–22. 
 185. See supra notes 101–04. 
 186. Recent Supreme Court precedent suggests that we should be extreme-
ly hesitant to analogize from the fraud and defamation exclusions from First 
Amendment protection. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584–86 
(2010). 
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different scenario from the negative-sum world of economic 
fraud.187 The question whether consumption of counterfeit Veb-
len brands has social value deserving of First Amendment pro-
tection thus collapses into a much more fraught question: 
whose perspective should be used to judge the social value of 
socially expressive conduct? As Judge Kozinski argued in his 
recent concurrence in United States v. Alvarez, this is precisely 
the type of question—the question of individual and community 
self-definition—that the First Amendment takes (or ought to 
take) out of the government’s hands: 
It doesn’t matter whether we think that such lies are despicable or 
cause more harm than good. An important aspect of personal auton-
omy is the right to shape one’s public and private persona by choosing 
when to tell the truth about oneself, when to conceal and when to de-
ceive. Of course, lies are often disbelieved or discovered, and that too 
is part of the pull and tug of social intercourse. But it’s critical to 
leave such interactions in private hands, so that we can make choices 
about who we are.188 
  * * *   
In sum, while some might question whether the First 
Amendment is implicated by the imposition of trademark in-
fringement liability under status-confusion doctrine, I submit 
that the better arguments lead to the conclusion that the 
Amendment should apply. But what are the implications of this 
conclusion? To answer this question, we must look to the na-
ture of the expressive burdens imposed by post-sale confusion 
doctrine, and the potential government interests that might 
justify the doctrine notwithstanding those burdens.189 This 
weighing of policy interests is relevant even if one does not 
agree with the foregoing conclusion that the First Amendment 
applies to the conduct at issue in status-confusion cases. At the 
very least, the social interests in allowing such conduct to con-
 
 187. See Akerlof, supra note 130 (using the lemons problem to explain how 
poor quality products and dishonest business dealings hurt honest business). 
See generally Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and 
Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967) (modeling the negative social welfare effects of 
theft). 
 188. 638 F.3d 666, 675 (9th Cir. 2011) (Kozinski, J., concurring). 
 189. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (“[A] govern-
ment regulation [that incidentally restricts expressive conduct] is sufficiently 
justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it fur-
thers an important or substantial government interest; if the governmental 
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental 
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essen-
tial to the furtherance of that interest.”). 
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tinue ought to be weighed against the interests in stamping it 
out. 
B. THE BURDEN OF STATUS CONFUSION ON SOCIAL EXPRESSION 
The First Amendment concerns raised by the enforcement 
of Veblen brands are different in kind from the concerns that 
have been raised by trademark scholars in other contexts. One 
strain of commentary focuses on the trademark as the subject 
matter of speech: the expansion of infringement and dilution 
liability, it is argued, gives trademark owners too much control 
over what others may say, directly or indirectly, about their 
marks.190 A second strain of commentary focuses on trademarks 
as lexemes: when symbols take on a set of non-source-
identifying meanings in popular culture, it is argued that the 
public has an interest in accessing and even modifying those 
meanings in cultural discourse, irrespective of the interests of 
the mark owner.191 In both strains of commentary, the battle 
lines over trademark-related speech are drawn between the ex-
pressive (and, impliedly, commercial) interests of the mark 
owner and the expressive interests of everyone else. 
Status confusion, in contrast, enlists mark owners as de-
fenders of the expressive interests of their customers, in opposi-
tion to those customers’ social competitors (who in turn are 
championed by the mark owners’ business competitors).192 The 
chief burden on speech imposed by the protection of Veblen 
brands thus arises from this social competition, and particular-
ly the problem of social scarcity. “For all of our technology, we 
cannot create a greater overall sum of social distinction. We can 
only allocate among ourselves the sum that we have.”193 Accord-
ingly, in order for some people to convey information about 
their social status credibly (for example, by consuming Veblen 
brands), others must be prevented from doing so.  
 
 190. See Denicola, supra note 51, at 158–60; Ramsey, supra note 155, at 
386 n.22 (citing sources); see also Laura A. Heymann, The Public’s Domain in 
Trademark Law: A First Amendment Theory of the Consumer, 43 GA. L. REV. 
651, 688–715 (2009) (analyzing the First Amendment autonomy interests of 
consumers as listeners entitled to diverse sources of meaning with respect to 
brands). 
 191. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as 
Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 397–99 
(1990); Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 960–63, 
972–77 (1993); cf. Sonia K. Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality, 57 UCLA L. 
REV. 1601 (2010). 
 192. See Grynberg, supra note 170, at 107–09. 
 193. Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, at 824. 
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This is the fundamental dilemma of social signaling, and 
thus of status confusion. Inevitably, someone’s social expression 
will be suppressed; the only questions are whose and how. If we 
do not enforce Veblen brands, and there is no other way of ra-
tioning access to social status, then social forces—norms, and, 
more importantly, economic and social incentives—restrain 
everyone, rich and poor alike, from expressing their desired 
messages. This is the lemons problem discussed in the previous 
Part.194 If, however, some naturally scarce resource can be used 
as the basis for allocating social status, then market forces—the 
high prices that result when demand for social status outstrips 
supply of the medium of its allocation—will restrain some (es-
pecially poorer) consumers from expressing their desired mes-
sage. This is the world of conspicuous consumption of naturally 
scarce goods documented by Veblen. 
But the status-confusion cases reveal a third option. If we 
enforce trademark rights in Veblen brands through status-
confusion doctrine, then the power of the State restrains some 
(again, poorer) consumers from expressing their desired mes-
sage.195 The status-confusion cases use the authority of federal 
law to suppress the social expression of the have-nots so as to 
enable the social expression of the haves.196 By channeling ex-
pression relating to social status into a market regime that 
rests on government-enforced monopolies (such as the trade-
mark regime), rather than on natural scarcity, the state is tak-
ing sides in the competition to define and claim social status by, 
in essence, subsidizing one side of that competition.197 
 
 194. See supra Part III.A. 
 195. See Lunney, supra note 21, at 421–33. 
 196. This competition engages social allegiances based not only on econom-
ic status, but on generational, ethnic, and gender identities as well. Notably, 
in the Hermès litigation, a female district judge who had found no public harm 
in the sale of copycat handbags to non-confused consumers was overruled by 
an appellate panel composed of three men, all older than she. See Hermès Int’l 
v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(Scheindlin, J.), rev’d, 219 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2000) (Telesca, J., joined by 
Meskill & Cabranes, JJ.). And of course, the counterfeiting debate reveals the 
uneasy interconnectedness of the developed and the developing world, with all 
the racial and ethnic baggage inherent in that dynamic. See ECONOMIC EF-
FECTS OF COUNTERFEIT, supra note 106, at 8 (“According to CBP data, seized 
counterfeit goods are dominated by products from China. During fiscal years 
2004–2009, China accounted for about 77 percent of the aggregate value of 
goods seized in the United States. Hong Kong, India, and Taiwan followed 
China, accounting for 7, 2, and 1 percent of the seized value, respectively.”). 
 197. Notably, the side receiving the subsidy appears to be the side less in 
need of it. 
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The central claim of this Article is that using the power of 
the State in this way runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s decla-
ration in Buckley v. Valeo: “[T]he concept that government may 
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to 
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the 
First Amendment.”198 By regulating who may stake a claim to 
social status and who may not—or, more specifically, by depu-
tizing private parties to invoke the coercive power of the law to 
do so—status confusion entangles the government in the zero-
sum, perpetual competition for social status. Moreover, it does 
so in a particularly burdensome way,199 by imposing the equiva-
lent of prior restraints against speakers who have not obtained 
permission to speak,200 ordering the forfeiture and destruction 
of property that constitutes the means of expression,201 and im-
posing harsh civil and criminal penalties as a deterrent to those 
who would provide the means of expression to those seeking 
unauthorized access to the restricted message.202 Finally, unlike 
other areas where the government may license private parties 
to control naturally scarce means of expression and then regu-
late their exercise of that control to serve the public interest 
(such as broadcasting spectrum),203 in the status confusion cas-
es the government regulation itself is creating the scarcity that 
results in unequal rights of expression.204 Particularly where 
 
 198. 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976). 
 199. Cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What 
Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance 
Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 5 (2000) [here-
inafter Tushnet, Copyright as a Model] (“If the justification were anything 
other than copyright, these sweeping powers would be seen as a gaping hole at 
the heart of free speech rights.”). 
 200. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (2006 & Supp. 2010) (authorizing ex parte 
awards of injunctive relief against trademark counterfeiters); see also Lemley 
& Volokh, supra note 155, at 216–24 (discussing the prior restraint doctrine as 
it applies to trademark injunctions). 
 201. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (authorizing ex parte seizure orders against 
counterfeit goods); 15 U.S.C. § 1118 (2006) (providing for destruction of in-
fringing articles). 
 202. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b)–(c) (2006 & Supp. 2010) (providing for treble 
damages and statutory damages for counterfeiting); 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2006 & 
Supp. 2010) (establishing criminal liability for trafficking in counterfeit 
goods). 
 203. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375–79 (1969). 
 204. This unique feature of Veblen brands also distinguishes status-
confusion cases from Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 
(1974), insofar as it is the government grant of a property right in the medium 
of expression, rather than the capital cost of finding alternative access to that 
medium, that causes the restriction on expression. One might argue that dis-
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the expression at issue is part of a debate over the relationship 
between wealth and social status, a government licensing re-
gime that has the effect of reinforcing such a relationship also 
has the effect of deciding the debate in favor of one side.205 In 
sum, the enforcement of Veblen brands uses government power 
to maintain a heavy burden on the social expression of already 
disadvantaged segments of American society. 
C. THE GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN THE MARKET FOR SOCIAL 
SPEECH 
What policy or interest might justify this selective and un-
equal206 restraint on expression? Insofar as technology in the 
long run can be expected to continue to reduce the cost of copy-
ing Veblen brands until it approaches the minimal cost of 
speech,207 the primary effect of status-confusion doctrine is to 
subject Veblen brands to an artificial condition of scarcity. By 
enforcing private rights to exclude others from certain symbolic 
expressions of social status, the status-confusion cases 
propertize and create a market for such signals. This right to 
exclude provides trademark owners with an incentive (in the 
form of monopoly pricing power)208 to restrict the supply of Veb-
len brands, which in turn allows Veblen brands to serve their 
signaling function. This Part will consider some possible inter-
 
appointed consumers (or entrepreneurs seeking to satisfy their demand for 
status signals) are as free to launch a competing Veblen brand as Tornillo was 
to start his own newspaper. The key distinction is that the barrier to entry 
that this expensive alternative represents is imposed not by the market price 
of ink or printing presses or distribution networks—status-confusion defend-
ants are not demanding access to their adversaries’ factories or supply 
chains—but only by the government’s enforcement of a monopoly on the in-
tangible Veblen brand itself. See infra Part III.C.1. 
 205. Cf. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 
1405, 1413 (1986) (“Individuals might be ‘free’ to start a newspaper in a way 
that they are not ‘free’ to start a TV station, because in the latter case they 
need both capital and government approval, while for the newspaper they 
need only capital. But that fact will not close the gap between autonomy and 
public debate; it will not guarantee that under autonomy principles the public 
will hear all that it must. Licensing may distort the market in some special 
way, but even the market dreamt of by economists will leave its imprint on 
public debate, not only on issues that directly affect the continued existence of 
the market, but on a much wider range of issues (though with such issues it is 
often difficult to predict the shape and direction of the skew).”). 
 206. That is, content-based and viewpoint-discriminatory. See supra note 
151. 
 207. See Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, at 830–40. 
 208. See Lunney, supra note 21, at 467–69. 
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ests the government might have in creating and maintaining 
this market. 
1. The Property Thesis: Free-Riding and Misappropriation 
One argument—raised in the Au-Tomotive Gold case209—is 
that status confusion liability is necessary to combat free-
riding. The status confusion defendant, one might argue, is 
reaping where he has not sown, extracting value from a Veblen 
brand that properly belongs to the plaintiff. Professor Harrison 
explicitly considers (and ultimately rejects) this justification for 
post-sale confusion, prompted to the issue by the provocative 
musings of Judge Kozinski.210 Harrison identifies this argument 
in favor of post-sale confusion with Lockean or “moral rights” 
theories of property founded on the moral claims of labor,211 
which is the framework within which I will begin to assess it. 
Certainly there is a trend toward property-based theories 
of trademark rights in recent years—the dilution statute being 
the clearest example.212 But there are still numerous problems 
with taking a moral rights approach to status confusion. The 
first is that it is unlikely that Lockean theory would support 
the rights claimed by status confusion plaintiffs. As others have 
argued, overbroad definitions of intellectual property rights vio-
late the “Lockean proviso” that property rights are morally jus-
tified only where they leave “enough, and as good” in common 
for others.213 Because status-confusion doctrine moves us from a 
 
 209. See Au-Tomotive Gold v. Volkswagen of Am., 603 F.3d 1133, 1138–39 
(9th Cir. 2010). 
 210. See Harrison, supra note 22, at 222 & n.104 (“[Judge Kozinski] sug-
gests, as many do, that one can link the exclusive right to intellectual property 
to Locke’s more general justification for individual property rights.”). 
 211. See id. at 220–26 (citing Kozinski, supra note 191, at 966–67). 
 212. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006) (“Subject to the principles of equity, 
the owner of a famous mark . . . shall be entitled to an injunc-
tion . . . regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of 
competition, or of actual economic injury.”). See generally Bone, supra note 46, 
(exploring the historical development of the misappropriation rationale under-
lying trademark law’s expansion). 
 213. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 15 (J.W. Gough 
ed., Blackwell 3d ed. 1976) (1690); see Harrison, supra note 22, at 220–26; cf. 
Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self Expression: Equality and Individu-
alism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1583–
91, 1605 (1993) (arguing that analogous assertions of trademark rights 
against expressive users in the absence of confusion are inconsistent with a 
properly reasoned Lockean account of intellectual property); Harrison, supra, 
at 225 (finding the exclusivity of intellectual property inconsistent with 
Lockean ideals); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Lockean Arguments for Private In-
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world in which all are equally able (or equally unable) to ex-
press a particular form of social message to one in which some 
are excluded from expressing such a message so that others 
might do so more effectively, the proviso would seem to be vio-
lated. 
More importantly, if we view the status-goods cases as re-
flecting a misappropriation or free-riding theory, we must ask: 
what is being misappropriated? On what interest of the plain-
tiff is the defendant taking a free ride? This is a question that 
has been well-examined by trademark scholars in other con-
texts. While some commentators argue that any value that in-
heres in a trademark should rightly be considered the mark 
owner’s property,214 this argument is a classic example of what 
Professor Felix Cohen famously referred to as “the 
‘thingification’ of property.”215 Cohen demonstrated the essen-
tial circularity of the argument: “It purports to base legal pro-
tection upon economic value, when, as a matter of actual fact, 
the economic value of a sales device depends upon the extent to 
which it will be legally protected.”216 
Professor Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss has argued that this 
circular “if value then right” argument poses a direct threat to 
expressive uses of trademarks, and must therefore be cab-
ined.217 Similarly, Professors Mark Lemley and Mark McKenna 
have argued that the circularity of the property-based free-
riding arguments that have provided momentum for the expan-
sion of trademark rights into markets where the mark owner 
does not compete demands that the expansion be “tied to some 
 
tellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF 
PROPERTY 138, 138 (Steven R. Munzer ed., 2001) (finding intellectual property 
a poor fit with Lockean theory, though not on grounds of the proviso). 
 214. See, e.g., Denicola, supra note 136, at 640–41 (arguing that a trade-
mark’s producer has the best claim to the mark’s commercial value, even if 
that value arises in the merchandising context); McCarthy, supra note 48, at 
3367–68 (using the language of property to defend post-sale confusion doc-
trine). 
 215. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Ap-
proach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 815 (1935) (“The current legal argument runs: 
One who by the ingenuity of his advertising or the quality of his product has 
induced consumer responsiveness to a particular name, symbol, form of pack-
aging, etc., has thereby created a thing of value; a thing of value is property; 
the creator of property is entitled to protection against third parties who seek 
to deprive him of his property.”). 
 216. Id.; see also Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual 
Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 178–80 (1992) 
(identifying numerous critiques of the “if value then right” argument). 
 217. Dreyfuss, supra note 191, at 400–12. 
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sort of social welfare calculus,” and resisted if this cannot be 
persuasively done.218 I submit that the same holds true for sta-
tus confusion.  
The argument in the status-confusion cases is that the val-
ue of Veblen brands lies in their exclusivity. Interfering with 
the mark owner’s ability to maintain artificial conditions of 
scarcity in order to cultivate that image of exclusivity lessens 
the value of such marks and thereby, it is argued, injures the 
mark owner.219 But of course, the mark owner is only able to 
maintain artificial conditions of scarcity because status-
confusion doctrine gives him the legal right to prevent others 
from producing additional copies of his mark. Absent such a 
right, there would be no way to maintain the artificial condition 
of scarcity, and thus no way for marks to acquire value based 
on such artificially maintained scarcity. Thus, the value that 
the owners of Veblen brands—and the courts that side with 
them—purport to be defending in the status confusion cases is 
entirely a product of those cases themselves, rather than any 
labor of the mark owner. 
In sum, the moral-rights-based “property” justification for 
status-confusion doctrine is inherently circular and ultimately 
empty. Because the claim of mark owners in the status confu-
sion cases places clear burdens on social expression, such 
claims ought not to be justified on such ill-conceived Lockean 
property rights grounds. Rather, the free-riding rationale must 
be grounded in some “social welfare calculus,”220 some conse-
quentialist argument that giving luxury brand owners a right 
to exclude others from accessing their trademarks—even in the 
absence of confusion of actual or potential purchasers—makes 
society better off despite the expressive burden that the right 
imposes on others. 
2. The Incentive Thesis: A Copyright Analogy 
A consequentialist take on the free-riding argument for 
post-sale confusion might lead us to reframe the lemons prob-
 
 218. Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. 
L. REV. 137, 181–84 (2010). 
 219. See, e.g., Ferrari S.P.A. v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1238 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(“Production of [Ferrari’s] cars is . . . intentionally limited to preserve exclusiv-
ity.”); id. at 1245 (“If the country is populated with hundreds, if not thousands, 
of replicas of rare, distinct, and unique vintage cars, obviously they are no 
longer unique.” (quoting Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabbriche Automobili v. 
McBurnie, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1843, 1848 (S.D. Cal. 1989))). 
 220. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 218, at 181–84. 
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lem discussed in Part II above as a different type of market 
failure. In one view, we could see it as an example of the trage-
dy of the commons.221 It is possible that in the absence of legal 
enforcement of Veblen brands, overconsumption would deplete 
their signaling value. Returning to the argument from Au-
Tomotive Gold,222 we might therefore characterize status confu-
sion as a free-riding problem. In the absence of status-confusion 
liability, excessive free-riding might lead the creators of Veblen 
brands to stop investing in their production. This is the public 
goods issue framed by Professor Harrison.223 A consequentialist 
free-riding argument in support of status-confusion doctrine 
would therefore depend on two propositions: that Veblen 
brands increase social welfare, and that giving their owners a 
right to exclude others is a necessary inducement to their crea-
tion. 
There are formal objections to this argument. In particular, 
it is significant that Professor Harrison’s analysis explicitly re-
lies on the Constitution’s Progress Clause.224 With all due re-
spect to Professor Harrison’s skilled economic and philosophical 
analysis, here he has made an error of law. The Progress 
Clause—which authorizes federal patent and copyright law—
has had no purchase on trademark law since the Trade-Mark 
Cases.225 Rather, the Lanham Act is an exercise of Congress’s 
power under the Commerce Clause.226 Viewing the govern-
ment’s interest in the status confusion cases as arising under 
the Progress Clause aligns Veblen brands more with copyright 
law than with trademark law.227 While the Progress Clause’s 
 
 221. For the classic account of the free-rider problem, see Garrett Hardin, 
The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
 222. Supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text. 
 223. Supra notes 118–25 and accompanying text. 
 224. Harrison, supra note 22, at 220–21 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 8) (giving Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and use-
ful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”))). 
 225. 100 U.S. 82, 93–94 (1879). 
 226. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (“The word ‘commerce’ means all com-
merce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.”). 
 227. There are similar formal objections to viewing the government support 
for Veblen brands as part of copyright policy—the useful articles doctrine chief 
among them. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); Brandir Int’l v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 
834 F.2d 1142, 1143 (1987). Of course, fashion designers—perhaps the prima-
ry producers of Veblen brands—have long but as yet unsuccessfully sought to 
circumvent these formal barriers with sui generis protection. Innovative De-
sign Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, S. 3728, 111th Cong. (2010); Design 
Piracy Prohibition Act, S. 1957, 110th Cong. (2007). 
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policy of generating new works of creative expression might 
significantly inform the relationship between copyright law and 
the First Amendment,228 no similar authority suggests that the 
federal government has an interest in encouraging the produc-
tion of new, symbolic expressions of hierarchical social status—
indeed, the Title of Nobility Clause suggests precisely the oppo-
site.229 
Even if such a policy could be fairly characterized as regu-
lation of commerce (a dubious proposition)230 the two premises 
of the consequentialist free-riding argument in favor of the pol-
icy are flawed. First, the very premise that economic incentives 
are required in order to ensure the production of new intangible 
goods is under increasing attack.231 Second, as discussed above, 
the alternative to enforcement of Veblen brands is not neces-
sarily a lemons-like market failure; absent legal intervention it 
is highly likely that either a fashion-like cycle of short-lived 
status signals would arise,232 or naturally scarce resources 
would come to meet the demand for status signals, as they did 
in Veblen’s day.233 Third, there is a strong argument that what-
ever incentive is properly attributed to trademark rights is no 
more than the incentive inherent in market competition—all 
trademarks do is allow the incentives of competition to work 
 
 228. See generally Tushnet, Copyright as a Model, supra note 199 (consid-
ering issues of copyright ownership in the context of the First Amendment). 
 229. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“No Title of Nobility shall be granted by 
the United States.”). 
 230. See supra notes 175–84 and accompanying text; see also supra note 
201. 
 231. See Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of Sauces: 
Should Thomas Keller ’s Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS 
& ENT. L.J. 1121 (2007); Blake Fry, Why Typefaces Proliferate Without Copy-
right Protection, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 425 (2010); Dotan Oliar & 
Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Any More): The Emergence of 
Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 
VA. L. REV. 1787 (2008); Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy 
Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. 
REV. 1687 (2006); see also Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and 
Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 521 (2009) (“Creativi-
ty, as lived, is more than a response to incentives, working from fixed and 
random preferences.”); cf. Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellec-
tual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://www.law 
.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events_media/Expressive_Incentives_in_ 
Intellectual_Property.pdf. 
 232. See generally Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21; Raustiala & 
Sprigman, supra note 231. 
 233. Supra notes 192–201 and accompanying text; infra Part III.C.3. 
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properly.234 Fourth, current economic and sociological research 
suggests that the owners of luxury brands have an incentive to 
permit at least some degree of counterfeiting, because doing so 
can actually increase the value of their brands.235 
Finally, and most importantly, it is unclear that Veblen 
brands generate positive social value at all. This is primarily 
because the value of Veblen brands, unlike the value of a work 
of authorship, is positional, not instrumental; relative, not ab-
solute.236 Certainly a successful claim of social status may pro-
vide the claimant with positive utility. But it also requires that 
social actors other than the successful claimant accept a lower 
social status—that they experience negative utility. The aggre-
gate positive utility of the segment of society that has access to 
Veblen brands is highly unlikely to exceed the aggregate disu-
tility of all individuals excluded from access to Veblen brands, 
given the relative size of the two populations. But even if net 
social utility were positive, social mobility and the waxing and 
waning power of individual Veblen brands generate a cycle of 
iterative (and costly) one-upsmanship that dissipates rather 
than creates social value.237 In sum, this “social welfare calcu-
lus” does not provide a convincing justification for the expres-
sive burdens of status-confusion doctrine. 
 
 234. Dreyfuss, supra note 191, at 399 (“[T]he justifications supporting oth-
er intellectual property rights, such as patents and copyrights, do not apply to 
expressive uses of trademarks because free ridership on the commercial aspect 
of marks is not a problem and besides, there is little need to create economic 
incentives to encourage businesses to develop a vocabulary with which to con-
duct commerce.”); Lemley & McKenna, supra note 218, at 172–77. 
 235. Barnett, supra note 22, at 1398–1408 (explaining how counterfeit 
products increase the “snob premium”); cf. Gosline, supra note 106, at 1–48 
(analyzing the impact of counterfeit consumption on consumers of the authen-
tic product). 
 236. Barnett, supra note 22, at 1386; see also Richard H. McAdams, Rela-
tive Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1–18 (1992) (providing an overview of the cur-
rent economic analysis of relative preferences). 
 237. Barnett, supra note 22, at 1414–18. It is notable, if unsurprising, that 
one of the leading economic models exploring conspicuous consumption must 
assume, rather than derive, the optimal value of a trademark in order to reach 
any useful conclusions. Higgins & Rubin, supra note 115, at 218. But see MA-
SON, supra note 108, at 1–11 (setting forth the argument that this iterative 
process of consumption generates economic activity on the supply side of the 
market that increases a society’s overall wealth) (citing BERNARD 
MANDEVILLE, THE FABLE OF THE BEES: OR, PRIVATE VICES, PUBLICK BENE-
FITS (1714)). 
 2012] VEBLEN BRANDS 825 
 
3. The Efficiency Thesis: Diverting Demand 
Despite the inadequacy of free-riding arguments, there 
may yet be a legitimate government interest that can justify 
status-confusion doctrine pursuant to the Commerce Clause. 
All of the foregoing analysis is subject to an important objec-
tion: Veblen brands are not responsible for the unequal alloca-
tion of access to the means of expressing a claim to social sta-
tus.238 If Veblen is to be believed, there will always be demand 
for symbols to express the message of superior social status, 
both by people with wealth and by people without it. In Veb-
len’s day, this demand was satisfied through material waste—
waste of labor, waste of precious materials, waste of time.239 
The great innovation of Veblen brands is that they enable con-
spicuous consumption without requiring the waste of naturally 
scarce resources. 
Perhaps, then, the most salient government interest in the 
market for Veblen brands is that it prevents the diversion of 
resources from socially valuable productive uses to socially 
wasteful competitive consumption.240 For example, platinum 
probably generates more social value in hydrogen fuel cells241 
than in “grillz.”242 If there must be competitive consumption, it 
is likely in society’s—and the government’s—interest that such 
consumption not divert needed resources from more productive 
 
 238. Lunney, supra note 21, at 468 (“[T]o the extent that one good loses 
value as a signifier of prestige, a new prestige good will arise to take its place. 
As a result, increasing the supply of one prestige good, even if it entails the 
complete destruction of the good’s value for purposes of prestige, does not rep-
resent an economic loss, but a transfer of prestige value from the old standard 
to the new.”). 
 239. See supra notes 138–43 and accompanying text. 
 240. Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, at 882 (“[A]s the production 
and consumption of immaterial status goods in the non-virtual world intensi-
fies under the auspices of intellectual property law, the costs to society of this 
zero-sum struggle are becoming very real. Resources better spent elsewhere, 
perhaps in the pursuit of absolute utility or ‘Progress,’ are instead spent in 
pursuit of intangible and otherwise typically quite meaningless and useless 
forms of relative utility.”); id at 826–27 (citing Ben Cooper et al., Status Effects 
and Negative Utility Growth, 111 ECON. J. 642, 643 (2001)); Robert H. Frank, 
Positional Externalities Cause Large and Preventable Welfare Losses, 95 AM. 
ECON. REV. 137 (2005). 
 241. Brian C.H. Steele & Angelika Heinzel, Materials for Fuel-Cell Tech-
nologies, 414 NATURE 345, 347 (2001) (“The second important problem is asso-
ciated with the electrocatalyst. For operation with pure hydrogen and air, 
platinum is the most active material.”). 
 242. See Nelly et al., Grillz (2005), available at http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=8fijggq5R6w&ob=av2e (“I got like platinum and white gold, tradi-
tional gold/I’m changin’ grillz every day, like Jay change clothes.”). 
 826 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:769 
 
segments of the economy.243 Such diversion could drive up the 
costs of inputs into productive economic activity and thus re-
duce the overall level of that activity. Viewed in this light, es-
tablishing and maintaining a market for Veblen brands could 
be considered a roundabout way of regulating commerce in 
more socially valuable and naturally scarce resources.244 
The most difficult question posed by status-confusion doc-
trine, then, is whether this benefit—which is undeniably a sub-
stantial one—justifies the doctrine’s costs. We might approach 
this problem strictly on the basis of economic analysis. We 
might ask: what would be the increased cost to productive us-
ers of acquiring naturally scarce goods that have become tar-
gets of conspicuous consumption where such consumption has 
no outlet to artificially scarce Veblen brands? And then we 
might compare that amount to the cost of perpetuating the sta-
tus confusion regime—in terms of administrative costs to gov-
ernment and litigants, for example. We might even expand the 
scope of our economic analysis to consider the aggregate utility 
and disutility experienced by competitors in the market for so-
cial status.245 Any of these approaches reduces the constitution-
ality of status-confusion doctrine to an empirical question as to 
which the relevant data are necessarily unavailable. 
 
 243. Rory Sutherland, Please Can You Refute This Argument, CAMPAIGN 
BLOG (Nov. 14, 2007, 9:18 PM), http://campaignblog.campaignlive.co.uk/2007/ 
11/14/please-can-you-refute-this-argument/ (“Brands are, after all, gloriously 
intangible. You can build a brand without killing trees and few precious raw 
materials are needed in their creation. The exploitation of child labour in mak-
ing brands is rare. And yet brand value creates pleasure and confers status as 
surely as any more wasteful (i.e., tangible) value. It may seem bizarre to say 
it, but brands actually succeed in making us happy with less. That is precisely 
why they make money for the people who own them.”); Rory Sutherland, Life 
Lessons from an Ad Man, http://www.ted.com/talks/rory_sutherland_life_ 
lessons_from_an_ad_man.html (“If you think about it, if you want to live in a 
world in the future where there are fewer material goods, you basically have 
two choices. You can either live in a world which is poorer, which people in 
general don’t like. Or you can live in a world where actually intangible value 
constitutes a greater part of overall value, that actually intangible value, in 
many ways is a very, very fine substitute for using up labor or limited re-
sources in the creation of things.”).  
 244. Of course, this argument assumes that the impulse for social competi-
tion will not be channeled into pursuits other than consumption—competitive 
philanthropy, for example, or competitive production. See Beebe, Sumptuary 
Code, supra note 21, at 884–87. Personally, I am of the view that Veblen’s ob-
servations on the universality and the unquenchability of the impulse to com-
petitive consumption—observations that find ample analogues in contempo-
rary society, see supra note 114—are strong support of this assumption. 
 245. Supra notes 236–43 and accompanying text. 
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But there is an argument that economic analysis is out of 
place, or at least insufficient, in this context. This argument 
places the First Amendment in a “preferred position” as against 
countervailing interests—particularly economic interests.246 
Whether such a preference is grounded in values such as indi-
vidual autonomy and self-fulfillment or on the interests of the 
community in fully informed social and political deliberation 
(two views of the First Amendment that are sometimes in con-
flict),247 it requires special solicitude for the expressive interests 
of individuals in social discourse. According to this view, mar-
ginal and unprovable decreases in aggregate utility are simply 
not a good enough justification for interfering with the expres-
sive rights of a significant portion of the community on issues of 
social concern.248 This is particularly so where that portion of 
the community loses those rights so that another portion of the 
community can enjoy greater expressive freedom than it would 
otherwise have. Given a choice between a system in which bur-
dens on expression and associated reductions in aggregate wel-
fare are allocated by the state and a system in which those 
burdens and costs are allocated by background social and eco-
 
 246. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942) (Stone, J., dissenting); 
Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 
YALE L.J. 877, 906 (1963) (“The Court’s obligation to bow to the will of the leg-
islature and the executive is at a minimum where a serious claim to infringe-
ment of freedom of expression on the part of those institutions is presented. In 
this sense, from the judicial point of view, freedom of expression should be re-
garded as a ‘preferred freedom.’”). See generally Robert B. McKay, The Prefer-
ence for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1182 (1959). 
 247. Compare Emerson, supra note 246, at 879–81 (noting the First 
Amendment value of self-fulfillment), with ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE 
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 26 (1948) (“Just so far as, at 
any point, the citizens who are to decide an issue are denied acquaintance 
with information . . . which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result must 
be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general good. It is that mutila-
tion of the thinking process of the community against which the First Amend-
ment to the Constitution is directed.”). But see BeVier, supra note 167, at 317–
22 (criticizing the “self-fulfillment” principle as a useful basis for First 
Amendment law). See generally Fiss, supra note 205 (comparing a First 
Amendment theory grounded in autonomy with one grounded in preserving 
the integrity of public debate). 
 248. Cf. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010) (“The First 
Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of 
speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits. 
The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people that 
the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs. Our 
Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that judgment simply on the ba-
sis that some speech is not worth it.”). 
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nomic forces, the First Amendment counsels us to opt for the 
latter system.  
Ultimately, this last justification for status-confusion doc-
trine is the only one that is even arguably persuasive, and it 
brings us to a fundamental conflict of normative and social al-
legiances. There is something duplicitous and subversive in 
consumption of counterfeit Veblen brands, but there is also 
something imperious and undemocratic in legal action to 
thwart that consumption. The interests behind any policy 
choice in this space are fundamentally incommensurate: on one 
side are economic interests, and on the other side are social and 
expressive interests. I have argued that the latter interests, be-
ing of constitutional dimension, ought to outweigh the former 
interests, which are ill defined and of dubious weight. But even 
those who disagree ought to recognize that status-confusion 
doctrine is highly suspicious as a matter of commerce policy. In 
the next Section, I offer policy solutions to accommodate either 
reaction to my analysis. 
D. TWO PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
For those who, like me, believe that status-confusion doc-
trine fails to justify itself, the appropriate policy response is 
straightforward: status confusion should be eliminated as a ba-
sis for trademark liability. As a mechanism for achieving this 
end, I propose a narrowly tailored defense that would do away 
with status-confusion liability without affecting other forms of 
trademark liability—even other forms of post-sale confusion li-
ability. This new defense would permit a trademark infringe-
ment defendant to assert the First Amendment interests of its 
customers as a complete defense to liability for trademark in-
fringement or counterfeiting if—but only if—an interpretation 
of the Lanham Act that encompasses status confusion is a nec-
essary condition for the imposition of such liability.  
Importantly, this defense would not require that defend-
ants be immunized from liability on other grounds—where an 
interpretation of the Lanham Act that encompasses status con-
fusion is merely a sufficient condition for liability.249 If the doc-
 
 249. This feature of my proposal is self-consciously designed to invoke the 
principle of constitutional avoidance, extirpating status-confusion liability as a 
matter of statutory interpretation of the Lanham Act rather than injecting 
First Amendment analysis into every trademark case in which socially expres-
sive consumption might be in evidence. Cf. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 
297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“The Court will not pass 
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trinal exposition of Part I establishes nothing else, it establish-
es that precision in defining the nature of the injury in cases 
that have heretofore been labeled “post-sale confusion” cases is 
paramount. There may be—almost certainly will be—cases in 
which a status-confusion plaintiff could establish likelihood of 
confusion under some other theory. If so, the First Amendment 
interests of the defendants’ customers would not be implicat-
ed—indeed those customers would likely be either perpetrators 
or victims of actionable confusion themselves. Forcing courts 
and litigants to draw the distinction between status-confusion 
and other theories of trademark infringement250 should have 
the salutary effect of assuring that any premium enjoyed by the 
mark owner reflects value that he himself has created, rather 
than the value that some consumers place on state-enforced re-
striction of the social expression of others. 
Finally, even those who come away unpersuaded by the 
constitutional analysis set forth above might, I hope, be per-
suaded that status-confusion doctrine strikes a poor balance 
even between the purely economic forces it attempts to regu-
late. Moreover, because I recognize that a proposal that would 
essentially legitimize counterfeiting presents problems of polit-
ical economy (to put it mildly), I would propose an alternative 
solution to the problem of status confusion, though the alterna-
tive may fare no better on this score. I propose that, if we can-
not bring ourselves to reject Veblen brands, at the very least we 
should be able to agree that the “social welfare calculus” de-
scribed above suggests that we ought not subsidize them, which 
is what we are doing under current law. To the contrary, they 
seem like an ideal target for Pigouvian taxation and redistribu-
tion.251 Given Veblen brands’ high social cost, we ought to re-
 
upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if 
there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed 
of . . . . Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a 
constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or gen-
eral law, the Court will decide only the latter.”). 
 250. This analysis obviously does not address the question whether a dilu-
tion claim might provide a trademark owner with similar relief to a status-
confusion claim, and, if so, whether the First Amendment should similarly 
provide a defense to such a dilution claim. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c) (2006 & 
Supp. 2010). While these questions are important, they are beyond the scope 
of this Article. 
 251. See ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 172–203 (4th ed. 
1962) (proposing a system of taxes and bounties to force private parties to in-
ternalize externalities). See generally William J. Baumol, On Taxation and the 
Control of Externalities, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 307 (1972) (defending and formal-
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quire that those costs be internalized by the status-confusion 
doctrine’s beneficiaries—the owners of Veblen brands and their 
customers.  
At the level of doctrine, this proposal would, at a minimum, 
imply cessation of publicly funded enforcement of status-
confusion claims, taking the burden off law- and border-
enforcement agencies to monitor for counterfeiting.252 It would 
probably also imply that damages be made unavailable as a 
remedy in status-confusion cases, limiting recovery to injunc-
tive relief.253 Indeed, full internalization of the costs of Veblen 
brands might suggest that even the successful status-confusion 
plaintiff ought to be compelled to compensate his defendant (or, 
in the spirit of Pigouvian taxation, the public) for the value of 
merchandise seized, and perhaps court costs and attorneys’ 
fees, depending on the magnitude of the resulting moral-hazard 
problem in the counterfeit market. One would expect that these 
costs, imposed on the owners of Veblen brands, would be passed 
on to their customers in the form of even higher prices for al-
ready high-priced goods. In this way, the market might serve to 
compel consumers to pay the socially optimal price for what 
they are really buying when they purchase a Veblen brand: 
governmental suppression of their neighbors’ social expression. 
  CONCLUSION   
Courts’ and commentators’ failure to distinguish among 
the various theories of injury that fall under the heading of 
“post-sale confusion” has, to date, made the doctrine something 
of a moving target. This imprecision has made principled appli-
cation of the doctrine difficult, generating arbitrariness in the 
post-sale confusion cases. Outcomes can be and often appear to 
be manipulated by emphasizing one theory of injury or down-
 
izing Pigou’s insight in models that account for the possibility of Coasean bar-
gaining). 
 252. 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (2006) (providing for customs interdiction of infring-
ing articles); 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2006) (establishing criminal liability for traf-
ficking in counterfeit goods). This proposal is contradicted by the economic 
analysis of Higgins and Rubin, see supra note 115, who find that public en-
forcement is preferable to private enforcement from a welfare-maximization 
standpoint. However, it is notable that Higgins and Rubin fail to provide a 
method for valuing a Veblen brand, declining to consider the disutility of con-
sumers who must accept lower social status as a result of the enforcement of 
Veblen brands. Id. 
 253. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2006) (imposing or increasing monetary penalties 
for trademark infringement and counterfeiting). 
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playing another.254 Some commentators have cited this arbitrar-
iness as evidence of ulterior motives—courts, it is argued, use 
the language of competition to mask concern over misappropri-
ation of the non-reputation-related value of trademarks.255 
This Article avoided such subjective causal explanations 
for the confused state of post-sale confusion doctrine, instead 
taking those opinions at face value and analyzing them critical-
ly. This approach resulted in the identification of three distinct 
theories of post-sale confusion. Still, each of these theories has 
serious flaws. Bystander confusion, while theoretically sound, 
needs further doctrinal development: in its current form, it 
merely invites abuse in the form of causal speculation. Down-
stream confusion, in contrast, is simply a tangle of doctrinal in-
consistency. In particular, it runs afoul of numerous long-
standing bodies of trademark law, including Supreme Court 
precedent. 
I have proposed fairly modest doctrinal changes to remedy 
the deficiencies in these two theories. With respect to bystander 
confusion, my proposed changes address the mechanics256 ra-
ther than the substance of the extant doctrine—for example, 
shifting burdens and discarding (perhaps unspoken) presump-
 
 254. For example, the First Circuit criticized a district court’s analysis of a 
post-sale confusion claim as “based on an erroneous premise. In finding that 
post-sale confusion was unlikely, the court commented that ‘there is little or 
no chance that [the faucets] will be resold to unwary consumers.’ Post-sale 
confusion refers not to the resale of the original product, however, but to the 
risk that non-purchasers, who themselves may be future consumers, will be 
deceived.” IP Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 44 (1st Cir. 1998) 
(internal citation omitted). The district court’s reasoning was perfectly con-
sistent with the downstream-confusion theory discussed in Part I.B., supra. 
Nevertheless, the First Circuit assigned error to that reasoning, opting instead 
for a bystander-confusion theory. Id. Other courts have engaged in similar 
blurring of lines between distinct theories of post-sale confusion, typically to 
avoid a finding against a trademark owner. See, e.g., supra notes 42–44 and 
accompanying text. 
 255. See supra note 43 and accompanying text; see also Bone, supra note 
46, at 593 (“Often, [the misappropriation theory] serves essentially as make-
weight, adding nothing significant to a decision adequately supported by in-
formation transmission policies. Sometimes it does a bit more work by seem-
ing to make judges feel more comfortable accepting tenuous confusion-based or 
consumer-oriented arguments. And sometimes, in those cases involving the 
very broadest expansions, misappropriation plays a more central role in driv-
ing judges to fashion novel confusion theories and to apply them in questiona-
ble ways.”). 
 256. See generally William McGeveran, Life in the Fast Lane: Of Presump-
tions, Defenses, and Burdens, 1 I.P. THEORY 25 (2011) (arguing that not just 
the substance but the mechanics of trademark law analysis can have a strong 
influence on both administrative costs and substantive outcomes). 
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tions to ensure that bystander confusion is consistent with oth-
er areas of trademark law. With respect to downstream confu-
sion, I have proposed discarding the obfuscatory label of “post-
sale confusion,” and suggested that courts apply traditional 
contributory-infringement and first-sale doctrine analysis. 
With these relatively minor changes, bystander- and down-
stream-confusion theories could be repurposed to target the 
confusion of actual or potential purchasers. Of course, continu-
ing to refer to such reformulated doctrines as “post-sale confu-
sion” would likely be a mis-description.  
The status-confusion cases, in contrast, do not lend them-
selves to such trivial doctrinal adjustment. They present a the-
ory unique in trademark law, one which turns the economic ra-
tionale for trademark protection into a rationale for 
governmental regulation of social expression. I have coined the 
term “Veblen brands” for trademarks that serve this socially 
expressive function. In this Article, I have argued that using 
government authority to maintain the market for Veblen 
brands is not only inconsistent with the policies underlying 
trademark law, but is also in tension with the First Amend-
ment. Because the government interest in enforcing Veblen 
brands is outweighed by the substantial and unequal burden 
such enforcement imposes on the social expression of already 
socially disadvantaged speakers, I conclude that status-
confusion doctrine should be discarded entirely, or, at the very 
least, significantly curtailed. 
